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14

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-3-102(4)(b) and
20A-4-406.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1; Did the District Court err in (1) allowing Gary Herbert ("Herbert") to file
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, in lieu of an answer to Steven G. Maxfield's ("Maxfield")
complaint brought pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 20A-4-402; and (2) hearing Herbert's
motion to dismiss without holding an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's complaint.
Standard of Review: "[A] district court's interpretations of Utah statutes and rules
of procedure are questions of law reviewed for correctness." In re Irrevocable Jack W.
Kunkler Trust v. Key Bank, 2011 UT 7, ^ 13, 246 P.3d 1184. A district court's
"management of its docket and trial schedule is reviewed for an abuse of discretion."
Clayton v. Ford Motor Co., 2009 UT App 154, lj 12, 214 P.3d 865.
Issue 2: Did the District Court err in granting Herbert's Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
where (a) suits by a registered voter based on alleged violations of Utah's election code
may only be pursued by the office of the Attorney General, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
20A-1-703, (b) Herbert was eligible at the time of the election, and (c) Herbert has never
been convicted of an offense under Utah's election code.
Standard of Review: "Whether a court properly granted a 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss is a question of law, which [is] review[ed] for correctness." Salt Lake City Corp.
v. Big Ditch Irrigation Co., 2011 UT 33, If 19, 258 P.3d 539. In reviewing the dismissal,
courts "accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and interpret those facts and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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all inferences drawn from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party." Oakwood Vill, LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101,19, 104 P.3d
1226. A court "may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal
ground or theory apparent on the record, even if it differs from that stated by the trial
court.55 Osguthorpe v. WolfMountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 29,110, 232 P.3d 999
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
PRESERVATION BELOW
Herbert does not dispute that Maxfield preserved the issues for appeal.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Const. Art. VII, $ 3:
(1) To be eligible for the office of Governor or Lieutenant Governor a person shall
be 30 years of age or older at the time of election.
(2) To be eligible for the office of Attorney General a person shall be 25 years of
age or older, at the time of election, admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah, and in good standing at the bar.
(3) To be eligible for the office of State Auditor or State Treasurer a person shall
be 25 years of age or older at the time of election.
(4) No person is eligible to any of the offices provided for in Section 1 unless at
the time of election that person is a qualified voter and has been a resident citizen of the
state for five years next preceding the election.
Utah Code:
Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-4-401 to -406, set forth in the Addendum.
former Utah Code Ann. § 20A-1-703 (2010), set forth in the Addendum.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
former Rule 1 (2011), set forth in the Addendum.
Rule 7, set forth in the Addendum.
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Rule 12, set forth in the Addendum.
Rule 81, set forth in the Addendum.
STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This is an appeal from a final order by the Honorable James Brady of the Fourth

Judicial District Court in Millard County (the "District Court") dismissing appellant
Steven G. Maxfield's ("Maxfield") election contest action against appellee Gary Herbert
("Herbert"), brought pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 20A-4-402(l)(b). The District Court
determined that allegations of misconduct under the election code must be pursued
through the procedures set forth in § 20A-1-703, and not § 20A-4-402. Further, the
District Court found that Herbert was eligible to run for governor. On these bases, the
District Court ruled that Maxfield had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. Maxfield asks this Court to reverse Judge Brady's decision.
B.

Course of Proceedings.
1.

Procedural History.

On December 23, 2010, Maxfield filed an election petition with the District Court,
alleging that Herbert and fellow gubernatorial candidate Peter Corroon ("Corroon") had
violated Utah's campaign reporting requirements contained in Utah's election code. (See
generally R. 1-17.) As such, they were alleged to be ineligible as candidates for governor
under Utah Code Ann. § 20A-4-402(l)(b). (Id.) Based on these alleged violations,
Maxfield requested that the District Court disqualify Herbert and Corroon as candidates
and declare Maxfield's running mate, Farley M. Anderson, winner of the election for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
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governor. (R. 4, 17.) Anderson allegedly received the third-highest number of votes. (R.
4.)
On January 3, 2011, Judge Derek P. Pullan, citing Utah Code Ann. § 20A-4-404,
assigned the case to Judge Brady and set a hearing on the matter for January 19,2011.
(R. 60-61.) That same day, the clerk of the Fourth District Court served the petition upon
Herbert and notified him that he had five days to respond. (R. 40.) On January 5, 2011,
Herbert responded by filing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).1
(R.63.)
Maxfield then filed three things. First, he filed a Motion to Quash, arguing that
Herbert's 12(b)(6) motion was procedurally improper (R. 86). Second, he filed a
memorandum in opposition to Herbert's motion to dismiss (R. 123). Third, Maxfield
i

filed a Request for Enlargement of Time for Hearing, requesting that the District Court
devote a full day to the matter (R. 89-90.) In light of the pending motions and Maxfield's
request for a full-day hearing, the District Court sent a notice to the parties on January 14,
2011, changing the date of the scheduled hearing from January 19th to January 25th.
(See R. 136, 245.) A few days later, on January 19, 2011, the District Court sent a further
notice indicating that the hearing would deal only with the pending motions to dismiss.
(R. 141.)
i

Corroon also responded with a motion to dismiss the claims asserted against him
(R. 92). The court granted Corroon's motion. Maxfield has not appealed the District
Court's grant of that motion in favor of Corroon.
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On January 25, 2011, the District Court heard arguments on the motions to
dismiss. (R. 253.) That same day, the District Court entered its order dismissing
Maxfield's petition. (R. 179.)
2.

Disposition Below.

In its order, the District Court first ruled that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
governed the case. (Id.) As a result, it held that Herbert's 12(b)(6) motion was a
procedurally allowable response to Maxfield's petition. (Id.) The District Court then
noted that the parties had agreed that (a) Herbert met the requirements of eligibility set
forth in the Utah Constitution, (b) that he had not been determined to be in violation of
the election code by any other District Court, and (c) he had not been convicted of a
crime involving violations of the elections code. (R. 180, 182.) Thus, there were no
allegations in the pleadings and "no evidence that [Herbert] was not eligible for the office
at the time of the election." (R. 182.) Finally, the District Court ruled that any
investigation and finding of an election code violation must "be pursued through the
Attorney General's Office as provided by § 20A-1-703" and not by a private citizen
under § 20A-4-402. (Id.) In dismissing Maxfield's claims, the District Court also
awarded Herbert his attorneys' fees and costs he incurred in the action. (R. 183.)
Following the District Court's determination, Maxfield filed a Motion for a New
Hearing, Amendment of Judgment, and Relief from Judgment. (R. 187.) After the
matter was fully briefed, the District Court affirmed its earlier ruling, with the exception
of the awarded attorneys' fees. (R. 243.) The District Court found that attorneys' fees
are not provided for under the statutes at issue. (Id.) This appeal by Maxfield followed.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The basic facts of this case are simple and undisputed. However, some additional
explanation of the quagmire of related cases is necessary to properly frame the issues for
this Court.
In 2010 Utah held a special election for the office of governor. Herbert ran in that
election as the Republican nominee.2 (R. 67.) It is undisputed that Herbert was
constitutionally eligible for office: he was 63 years old at the time of the election, had
been a Utah resident for more than five years, and was a registered voter. (R. 67, 127.) It
is also undisputed that there had been no determinations under Utah's election code (the

<

"Election Code") that would disqualify Herbert from office, nor had Herbert ever been
convicted of a criminal offense that would disqualify him from being governor. (R. 253
at pp. 39-40.)
On September 21, 2010, Maxfield filed a petition with the Lieutenant Governor's
office in which he alleged that gubernatorial candidates Herbert and Corroon, among

<

others, had failed to comply with campaign reporting requirements in violation of the
Election Code. (R. 67-68.) (the "Lt. Gov. Petition"). Maxfield filed the Lt. Gov. Petition
under Utah Code Ann. § 20A-1-703.3

<
2

Maxfield was also a participant in the 2010 election, running for the office of
Lieutenant Governor alongside Farley M. Anderson, who was a gubernatorial candidate.
(R. 125.)
3
Utah Code Ann. § 20A-1-703(1) provides that "[a]ny registered voter who has
information that any provisions of [the Utah Election Code] have been violated by any
candidate . . . may file a verified petition with the lieutenant governor."
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*

On October 14, 2010, Maxfield filed a pro se Petition for Extraordinary Writ of
Emergency Relief with the Utah Supreme Court (the "First Supreme Court Action").
{Id.) In the First Supreme Court Action, Maxfield asked the Court to order the
Lieutenant Governor to forward the Lt. Gov. Petition to Utah's Attorney General, and to
appoint outside counsel to bring suit against Herbert for violations of Utah's election
laws. (Id) The following day, Maxfield filed another Petition for Emergency Relief in
the same case, requesting that this Court order "Respondents to file all responses . . .
within three days and that this court make its decision as early as possible." (Id.) On
October 19, 2010, the Supreme Court dismissed both petitions and advised Maxfield that,
"to the extent relief is available, the request for that relief should be sought as a
declaratory judgment pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 78B-6-401, et seq." (R. 69; Utah
Supreme Court Order, Case No. 20100803-SC, Oct. 20, 2010.)
On October 19, 2010, a day before the dismissal of the First Supreme Court
Action, Maxfield, joined by another election candidate, Stephen K. Maxfield (Maxfield's
father), filed a pro se petition with the Third Judicial District Court (Judge Paul G.
Maughan) (the "Judge Maughan Action"). (R. 69, 126.) Maxfield brought the Judge
Maughan Action under Utah Code Ann. § 20A-1-404, and sought a declaratory judgment
that various candidates, including Herbert, had violated Utah's election laws. (R. 69,
126-27.) Notably, the allegations in the petition were exactly the same as those contained
in the previously filed Lt. Gov. Petition. (R. 69.)
On October 29, 2010, Maxfield filed two more pleadings with the Utah Supreme
Court (the "Second Supreme Court Action" and the "Third Supreme Court Action,"
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
-7-may contain errors.
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respectively). (R. 69-70.) In the Second Supreme Court Action, Maxfield filed a Motion
for Emergency Relief and Petition for Interlocutory Appeal, requesting that the Supreme
Court order Judge Maughan to schedule an evidentiary hearing in the Judge Maughan
Action. (R. 69.) In the Third Supreme Court Action, Maxfield—joined by Farley M.
Anderson and Steven K. Maxfield—sought an emergency order preventing the "Lt.
Governor and all those under his control" from counting or tallying the votes for various
candidates, including Herbert, and from certifying the election results until the Judge
Maughan Action was resolved. (R. 70.) In mid-December 2010, the Supreme Court
denied relief in both actions.4 (R. 83-85.)

<

On December 23, 2010, Maxfield filed his complaint in the Fourth District, which
is the case Maxfield now appeals (the "Fourth District Action"). (R. 1.) Although the
Fourth District Action was brought under a different section of the Election Code than
Maxfield cited in his previous actions, it is based on the same factual allegations that
Maxfield asserted in the original Lt. Gov. Petition. (R. 1,4-11, 70.)

*

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This is not a complicated case. It requires only a straightforward interpretation of
a few statutory provisions. Nevertheless, Maxfield goes to great lengths to conjure issues
where none exist. Maxfield's arguments are meritless, and the District Court's order
should be affirmed.
4

Following the dismissal of Maxfield's Third Supreme Court Action, Judge Robin
W. Reese was assigned to the Judge Maughan Action. (3d Dist. Ct. Docket, Case No.
100920163.) Judge Reese has since granted Herbert's motion to dismiss. (Id.) Maxfield
did not appeal that decision.
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*

Maxfield first raised the factual allegations upon which this action is based in the
Lt. Gov. Petition that he filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 20A-1-703. Maxfield was
not content, however, to wait upon the action of the appropriate state officers. As such,
he filed a host of actions asking courts to place him in the shoes of the Lieutenant
Governor and the Attorney General so he could, by himself, prosecute Herbert's alleged
wrongdoing. These actions have been brought under various sections of the Election
Code, including §§ 20A-1-703, 20A-1-404, and 20A-4-402. Notwithstanding the
different code sections Maxfield cites, all of his actions are based on the same alleged
violations that he raised in his Lt. Gov. Petition.
This appeal is yet another attempt by Maxfield to become Lieutenant Governor.
Like the other actions he filed, Maxfield5 s requested relief should be denied. First,
Maxfield's contention that an election contest petition cannot be answered with a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim is baseless. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
expressly indicate that they apply to all court proceedings, except where their application
would be clearly inapplicable. Second, Maxfield's procedural claims regarding the date
on which the District Court held its hearing are meritless. While the Election Code does
provide a date by which an election contest should be heard, the District Court acted
within its discretion when it changed the date of the hearing in response to the pending
motions to dismiss and Maxfield's request for a longer hearing. Further, even if the
District Court did err in changing the date, Maxfield is not entitled to a reversal because
he was not prejudiced by the scheduling change.
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Third, turning to the merits of the case, this Court should affirm the District
Court's dismissal for several reasons.
1.

Maxfield's petition must be dismissed because § 20A-4-402 does not allow
a private right of action against candidates based upon alleged violations of
the Election Code. Under the Election Code, if a registered voter becomes
aware of a potential violation, he or she may file a petition with the
Lieutenant Governor. Maxfield has done this, and, short of being given
leave by the Attorney General under § 20A-1-703, he is not entitled to
litigate those alleged violations in another forum or proceeding.

2.

<

Maxfield's petition also fails because the office of governor is created by
the Utah Constitution, and the eligibility requirements for that office are
defined therein.

3.

Even if this Court were to accept Maxfield's argument that the eligibility
requirements of a gubernatorial candidate include statutory requirements,
Maxfield's petition still should be dismissed because it is premature.
Herbert has never been found to have violated laws that would preclude his

<

candidacy for office. Such a finding would be a prerequisite to determining
that he was ineligible.
4.

The District Court's dismissal of Maxfield's claims was not based on
improper form, but rather on the substantive deficiencies of his petition.
Legally, Maxfield is not entitled to relief based on any of the allegations
raised therein.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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<

In short, Maxfield has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Accordingly, the District Court's Order should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S PROCEDURES WERE NOT IMPROPER.
Maxfield asserts on appeal that the District Court erred in allowing Herbert to

respond to the complaint with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and in rescheduling an
earlier hearing. Specifically, Maxfield asserts that the deadlines for responding to a
complaint and for setting an evidentiary hearing are contained in Utah Code Ann. § 20A4-403, and that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to proceedings brought
under that statute. Maxfield is mistaken.
"[A] district court's interpretations of Utah statutes and rules of procedure are
questions of law reviewed for correctness." In re Irrevocable Jack W. Kunkler Trust v.
Key Bank, 2011 UT 7, ^ 13, 246 P.3d 1184. Further a district court's "management of its
docket and trial schedule is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." Clayton v. Ford Motor
Co., 2009 UT App 154, ^ 12, 214 P.3d 865. The District Court's interpretations and
scheduling efforts were proper and should not be overturned.
A.

A Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Is Procedurally Allowed in the
Context of Election Contests,

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 1 provides that the Rules "shall govern the
procedure in the courts of the state of Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil
nature, . . . and in all special statutory proceedings, except as governed by other rules
promulgated by this court or enacted by the Legislature and except as stated in Rule 81."
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Utah R. Civ. P. 1(a) (emphasis added). Rule 81, in turn, provides that the Rules "shall
apply to all special statutory proceedings, except insofar as such rules are by their nature
clearly inapplicable." Utah R. Civ. P. 81(a) (emphasis added). "In determining whether
civil procedure rules generally apply to [statutory] proceedings, as well as whether a

(

specific rule applies, [a court's] primary goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent in
light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve."5 Thiele v. Anderson, 1999 UT
App 56, Tf 14, 975 P.2d 481 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, a court
should consider the plain language of the statute at issue, but should also interpret and
apply the Rules of Civil Procedure liberally "where no prejudice or disadvantage to

<

anyone results." Id.
Proceedings brought under § 20A-4-402 are subject to various statutorily imposed
i
6

procedural requirements. Notably, however, these rules do not address many important
procedural issues that arise in litigation of this sort, such as the form of the answer or how
«
5

This Court need not determine whether proceedings brought under Utah Code
Ann. § 20A-4-402 are "special statutory proceedings" because, as explained infra, "even
if they are, . . . the rules of civil procedure as a whole are not by their nature clearly
inapplicable." Thiele, 1999 UT App 56, ^f 13 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
6
For example, the contest must be brought "within 40 days after the canvass"
(-403(l)(a)); specific information must be contained in the complaint, including "one or
more of the grounds for an election contest specified in Section 20A-4-402" (-403(l)(b));
"[t]he respondent shall answer the petition within five days after the service"(-403(5)(c));
a petitioner must reply to a counterclaim "within 10 days after service" (-403(5)(e)); and
the chief judge shall set a date to hear and determine the contest "not less than 10 nor
more than 30 days from the date the petition was filed" (-404(1 )(b)(ii)). Moreover, §
20A-4-405 specifically provides that the "court shall enter judgment for costs against the
party contesting the election if... the proceedings are dismissed for . . . insufficiency of
pleading or proof...." § 20A-4-405(l)(a)(i).
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to serve it (addressed in Rules 5, 7, and 10 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure), how to
raise counterclaims or bring in third parties (addressed in Rules 13 and 14), and,
importantly, what a party's available defenses are and how those should be raised
(addressed in Rules 8 and 12). Accordingly, the mere fact that the applicable statutes
"do[] not contain—nor do [they] purport to contain—a complete set of procedural
guidelines" indicates that the rules, including Rule 12, are not "inherently and obviously
inapplicable . .. ." See Thiele, 1999 UT App 56, ^ 15.7
Utah courts have recognized that responding to an election contest petition with a
motion to dismiss is procedurally proper. See, e.g., Johnstun v. Harrison, 197 P.2d 470,
472 (Utah 1948) (respondent answered an election petition contest, with a general

Moreover, § 20A-4-405 specifically provides that the "court shall enter judgment
for costs against the party contesting the election if... the proceedings are dismissed for
.. . insufficiency of pleading or proof. . . . " § 20A-4-405(l)(a)(i). Thus, far from being
clearly inapplicable, it appears that the legislature expressly considered that petitions
might be dismissed based upon a party's failure to state a valid claim within its pleadings
and provided that a defendant was entitled to his or her costs in such a situation.
o

Although these cases involved earlier provisions of Utah's election code, the
provisions specifically governing election contests are substantially similar to those at
issue in this case. One noteworthy difference, however, is that unlike the current code,
which requires service of the complaint and then an answer within five days of service,
see Utah Code Ann. § 20A-4-403(5), the older versions contain no requirements for
service or an answer, except that notice of the required hearing must be given to a
respondent "at least five days before the [hearing]," Utah Code Ann. § 25-14-8 (1943).
Thus, the inclusion of language requiring service of the complaint and an answer in later
versions of the code merely seem to acknowledge the reality that respondents were
answering these early petitions through demurrers, answers, and otherwise (in lieu of
simply showing up at a hearing), rather than limiting the permissible ways that a party
may "answer" a petition.
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demurrer);9 Spear v. Marshall, 79 P.2d 15, 15 (Utah 1938) (same)); Payne v. Hodgson,
97 P. 132, 134 (Utah 1908) (same)); Carbis v. Dale, 65 P. 204, 204 (Utah 1901) (same));
see also Thiele, 1999 UT App 56, ^ 16 (stating that "review of the . .. statute's plain
language and [Utah courts'] past approval of the use of civil procedure rules,"

{

demonstrate that "the rules of civil procedure are not by their nature clearly inapplicable"
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Not only have courts held that motions
to dismiss are proper responses to an election contest petition, one Utah court held that a
defendant had waived certain defenses by not filing one. In Skewes v. Bliss, 196 P. 850
(Utah 1921), the court specifically held that the respondent had waived his opportunity to

<

challenge the sufficiency of an election dispute because he answered the complaint with a
traditional answer rather than by demurrer.10 Id. at 851.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure applied to the District Court proceeding that
Maxfield appeals. The rules themselves say so, as have Utah courts. This Court should
not find that the District Court abused its discretion by allowing Herbert to file a motion
to dismiss.
i
9

A general demurrer was "[a] pleading stating that although the facts alleged in
the complaint may be true, they are insufficient for the plaintiff to state a claim for relief
. . . " and are now generally "termed a motion to dismiss." Black's Law Dictionary 465
(8th ed. 1999).
10
Skewes was brought under chapter 15 of Title 27 of the Compiled Laws of Utah
(governing "Prevention and Punishment of Corrupt Practices in Elections") rather than
chapter 16 (governing "Elections Contests"). See Skewes, 196 P. at 850. However, the
Skewes court's holding is still important in this case because, similar to Utah Code Ann.
§ 20A-4-403(5)(c), chapter 15 also provided a specific time period in which a party was
required to answer—under that statute, 10 days. See Compiled Laws of the State of Utah,
§2398(1917).
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B.

The Court Did Not Err in Rescheduling the Date of the Original
Hearing, and Maxfield Has Failed to Demonstrate Any Prejudice
Resulting from the Change.

In Utah, district courts enjoy "broad discretion in managing the cases assigned to
their courts." Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992) (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 16). This discretion extends to the management and
administration of the court's docket, including motion practice and trial scheduling. See
State v. Bergeson, 2010 UT App 281, ^f 7, 241 P.3d 777. Nevertheless, even where a
court abuses this discretion or otherwise errs as a matter law, its decision will not be
reversed absent a showing of prejudice by the objecting party. See, e.g., King v. Fereday,
739 P.2d 618, 622 (Utah 1987) (stating that a court "may reverse a trial court judgment
only if there is a reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, there would have been a
result more favorable to the complaining party" (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
There was no error in this case. Upon receiving the election contest petition, the
District Court scheduled a hearing for January 19, 2011. This date fell within the 20-day
window § 20A-4-404(l)(b) provides. After the hearing was scheduled, Herbert and
Corroon filed motions to dismiss. Maxfield then filed a "Request [sic] Enlargement Of
Time For Hearing," requesting that the court schedule a full day for the hearing. {See R.
89.) Accordingly, the District Court rescheduled the hearing to January 25, 2011.
Rescheduling the hearing was within the sound discretion of the District Court based
upon the realities of the proceeding and Maxfield's own request for a longer hearing. As
the District Court explained in denying Maxfield's Motion for a New Hearing,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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[t]he court scheduled a hearing date within the 20 day period required by
statute, and allowed two hours for the hearing. The court would have
proceeded as scheduled, but for the Respondents filing motions to dismiss
and Petitioner's request for a full day in which to present his evidence.
(R. 245.)
Even if the District Court did err in changing the date of the hearing—and it did
not—Maxfieid is not entitled to a reversal because he has not demonstrated any prejudice
resulting from the court's decision to change the hearing date. In his brief, Maxfieid tries

i

to avoid this fact by alleging that he was "unfairly prejudiced . . . as he was unable to
present any facts to support any one of the causes for an election contest." (Appellant's
i

Br. at 53.) Significantly, however, this alleged prejudice is a direct result of the District
Court's decision to grant Herbert's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, not from its decision to
change the hearing date. Indeed, Maxfieid's own response upon being notified of the

(

date change was "great, we've got more time." (R. 253 at p. 7.) The District Court did
not err in changing the date of the hearing. Even if it did, Maxfieid was not prejudiced by
the change. Reversal is not justified.
II.

THE COURT PROPERLY GRANTED HERBERT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS-

(

Maxfieid contends that the District Court erred by granting Herbert's motion to
dismiss. Maxfieid's contention is unfounded. "Whether a court properly granted a
i
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is a question of law, which [is] review[ed] for correctness."
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Big Ditch Irrigation Co., 2011 UT 33, f 19, 258 P.3d 539. In
reviewing the dismissal, courts "accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and
interpret those facts and all inferences drawn from them in the light most favorable to the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

plaintiff as the non-moving party." Oakwood VilL, LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT
101, f 9, 104 P.3d 1226. A court "may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even if it differs from
that stated by the trial court." Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 29,
*! 10, 232 P.3d 999 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
This appeal focuses on the District Court's straightforward legal determination
based upon the plain language of the relevant statutes. Accordingly, this Court can affirm
the District Court's decision on several grounds. First, suits by a registered voter based
on alleged violations of the Election Code must be brought pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 20A-1-703. Second, eligibility for the office of governor is determined by the Utah
Constitution. Third, even assuming that a violation of the Election Code affects a
gubernatorial candidate's eligibility for office under § 20A-4-402, Maxfield's suit is
premature as there has been no determination under § 20A-1-703 that Herbert has
violated the Election Code.
A.

Utah Code Ann. § 20A-4-402 Does Not Provide Voters with a Private
Right of Action Against Candidates for Alleged Election Code
Violations.

Maxfield filed the Petition with the District Court pursuant to §§ 20A-4-402 and
20A-4-403 of the Election Code. {See R.l.) However, as with each of his previous
actions, the underlying allegations in this action are assertions that Herbert violated
campaign and financial reporting requirements contained in the Election Code. (See R. 3,
8-10.) The Lieutenant Governor is the officer primarily charged with enforcing the
applicable provisions for gubernatorial candidates. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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206, -403, -1001 to -1004. To assist the Lieutenant Governor, Utah Code Ann. § 20A-1703 provides that a "registered voter who has information that any provisions of this title
have been violated by any candidate . . . may file a verified petition with the lieutenant
governor." If such a petition is filed, the Lieutenant Governor gathers information
relating to the petition and determines if a special investigation is necessary. Utah Code
Ann. §20A-l-703(2).
If the Lieutenant Governor determines that a special investigation is necessary, he
forwards the information to the Attorney General. Id. The Attorney General then
determines if probable cause exists such that special counsel should be appointed and a
proceeding commenced. Id. § 20A-l-703(3). If the Attorney General does determine
that probable cause exists, then a registered voter may be allowed to bring a special
proceeding in the name of the state to investigate the alleged violations. Id. § 20A-1703(4)(a). There are no other means by which a registered voter may commence a
proceeding based upon alleged violations of the Election Code.11

11

Maxfield attempts to rely upon section 20A-1-703(5), which states that
"[n]othing in this section may be construed to prohibit any other civil or criminal actions
or remedies against alleged violators," for the proposition that section 20A-1-703 is not
his only remedy. (Appellant's Br. at 48.) However, "a right of action on a particular
state of facts does not exist unless the authority for bringing it is found either in common
or statutory law." 1 Am. Jur. 2d Actions § 36 (2005); see also Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT
12,fflf20-21, 66 P.3d 592 (stating that "[i]n the absence of language expressly granting a
private right of action in the statute itself, the courts of this state are reluctant to imply a
private right of action" and that a right of action requires more "than a mere allusion to
'civil actions' as evidence of a legislative intent to impart substantive rights"). Utah's
election code only authorizes a suit by a private party in section 20A-1-703, and then
only after receiving leave from the Attorney General and in the name of the state. See
§ 20A-l-703(4)(a). Thus, any other potential claims that Maxfield could have brought
(continued . . .)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 O

<

i

The proper way for Maxfield to raise any alleged violations of the Election Code
is through the process set forth in § 20A-1-703. That process begins with a petition filed
with the Lieutenant Governor, which Maxfield has already filed. Each action Maxfield
has filed, including this one, is merely an attempt to circumvent the statutory process set
forth in § 20A-1-703. Fortunately, the courts have properly recognized that any action
based upon these allegations may only be brought through the the Lieutenant Governor
and the Attorney General and only in compliance with the provisions of § 20A-1-703.
This Court should reach a similar conclusion.
As Herbert argued before the District Court,
[to] permit the sort of suit which Maxfield is attempting to bring under
§ 20A-4-403 would allow aspiring candidates to circumvent the process the
Utah legislature has established and become a self-appointed de facto
lieutenant governor / attorney general charged with enforcing the election
code. If the law were as Maxfield imagines, any Utah registered voter
could haul elected officials to court in every county throughout Utah by
merely alleging inadequacies in an official's campaign disclosures. Utah
Code Ann. § 20A-1-703 prevents such chaos, while still allowing registered
voters to raise their concerns for investigation by the lieutenant governor's
office and the attorney general.
(R. 173-74.) Thus, this action should be recognized for what it is: an attempt to assert a
private right of action where none exists. The District Court's dismissal should be
affirmed.

(. . . continued)
would have to have been based on something other than alleged violations of the election
code and brought under the common law or some other chapter of the Utah Code.
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B.

Eligibility Is Defined by the Utah Constitution.

In addition to the grounds stated above, Maxfield's petition was properly
dismissed because eligibility of a gubernatorial candidate is defined by the Utah
Constitution. Maxfield claims that Herbert was not "eligible" for the office of governor.
Maxfield's claim is based on the mistaken premise that eligibility for office is determined
by whether a gubernatorial candidate properly filed all campaign reports required under
the Election Code. Maxfield is wrong.
Eligibility for the office of governor is defined by the Utah Constitution. Article
VII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution sets forth the "Qualifications of officers" for the
Executive Department, and provides that to be "eligible for the office of Governor" an
individual must be (1) "30 years of age or older at the time of the election"; (2) "a
qualified voter"; and (3) "a resident citizen of the state for five years next preceding the
election." Utah Const. Art. VII, § 3(1), (4). It is undisputed that Herbert meets all of
these requirements and is thus eligible for the office.

In his brief, Maxfield cites two unpublished district court memoranda decisions
in support for his argument that a candidate may bring suit against another candidate for
lack of eligibility based upon a failure to comply with statutory requirements. See
Torgerson v. Albrecht, No. 020600034 MI (Utah 6th D. Ct. Jan. 23, 2003); Maxfield v.
Wimmer, No. 110900149 (Utah 3d D. Ct. June 29, 2011). Both cases are easily
distinguishable from the case at hand. The distinguishing feature of Torgerson is that the
office at issue was that of a county sheriff—an office for which there is no constitutional
definition of eligibility. Thus, the court was left to determine eligibility from the only
available source: the statutory qualifications laid out in the Utah Code. See § 17-22-1.5
In Wirnmer, Maxfield brought an election controversy proceeding against a recently
elected and seated state legislator. However, the court dismissed that action on the
express grounds that it does not have authority to sustain an election controversy action
(continued . . .)
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Maxfield's argument attempts to equate a gubernatorial candidate's potential
disqualification for violations of the Election Code with that candidate's constitutionally
defined eligibility. See, e.g., § 20A-11-206(1) (stating that state office candidates who
fail to file certain statements may be disqualified). Maxfield's position is overreaching.
Disqualification of a gubernatorial candidate based upon violations of the Election Code
is not the same as a lack of eligibility. The Utah Constitution defines the three
requirements a gubernatorial candidate must meet to be "eligible." An action brought
1 O

pursuant to § 20A-4-402 only relates to these requirements.

It is undisputed that

Herbert meets the constitutional requirements for eligibility. The dismissal of this action
should be affirmed.
C.

Even Assuming That a Gubernatorial Candidate's Eligibility Were Not
Limited to the Constitutional Definition, Maxfield's Suit Would Be
Premature.

Finally, even accepting Maxfield's argument that a gubernatorial candidate can be
deemed ineligible based on a violation of the Election Code, the current action would
first require some court to have found that Herbert violated the Election Code. As the
District Court recognized, "the main crux of the issue for me to consider is whether or not
this is the proper Court and proper forum to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding
(. . . continued)
against a member of the state house of representatives once he or she is seated. Any
other statements in that opinion are pure dicta.
According to Maxfield, Herbert has argued that campaign finance reporting
requirements are somehow unconstitutional. Herbert makes no such argument. Gary
Herbert's argument, as it concerns the Utah Constitution, is simply that "eligibility," as it
pertains to an action brought under § 20A-4-402 and involving a constitutionally created
office, is defined in the Utah Constitution.
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disqualifications of the Governor[.]" (R. 253 at p. 41.) As already explained in this brief,
it is not.
There is no dispute that Herbert meets the constitutional eligibility requirements
for the office of governor. (See R. 253 at p. 39.) There is no dispute that Herbert has no

,

criminal convictions that would disqualify him from candidacy. (R. 253 at pp. 39-40.)
There is no dispute that there has been no determination made by a court or other body
<

that Herbert has violated the Election Code. (R. 253 at p. 40.) Accordingly, even under
Maxfield's theory of eligibility, "[tjhere is no evidence that [Herbert] was not eligible for
the office at the time of the election." (R. 182.) Maxfield has already filed the Lt. Gov.

(

Petition in accordance with § 20A-1-703, the only action that he is entitled to take based
on the underlying allegations of his complaint. Absent a determination under that process
that Herbert violated the alleged provision of the Election Code, this current action is
premature.
III.

THE COURT'S DISMISSAL OF MAXFIELD'S COMPLAINT WAS NOT
BASED UPON A LACK OF FORM.

i

As a last-ditch effort to continue his legal assault against Herbert, Maxfield argues
that the District Court was prohibited from dismissing his complaint for "lack of form."
See § Utah Code Ann. 20A-4-403(4). According to Maxfield, his allegations that Herbert
violated campaign finance reporting requirements were more than sufficient to advise
Herbert "of the particular proceeding or cause for which the election is contested." Id.
As with Maxfield's other arguments, this contention also fails. While it is true that
the weight of authority holds that statutes governing contested elections
should be liberally construed[,] . .. this rule of liberal construction may
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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[not] be extended so as to overturn the well-established rule of practice that
the evidence must be confined to the issues raised by the pleadings, and that
the judgment rendered must conform thereto.
Earner v. Howell, 86 P. 1073, 1076 (Utah 1906). Thus, in the context of an election
contest, a party "must recover upon the allegations of the pleadings . . . or not at all." Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Maxfield's petition was not dismissed because he committed some procedural
error that the court could have overlooked. Rather, after considering all of the underlying
allegations in Maxfield's petition, the District Court concluded that Maxfield failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted under any of the provisions of § 20A-4402. Thus, dismissal was warranted. The District Court's dismissal should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the District Court's Order
dismissing Maxfield's complaint against Herbert for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
DATED: November 30, 2011.
Respectfully submitted,
STOEL RIVES LLP

Timothy K. Conde
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ELECTION RETURNS AND ELECTION CONTESTS

20A-4-401

(ii) publish and file the results of the canvass in the lieutenant
governor's office.
(b) The lieutenant governor shall certify the results of the Western
States Presidential Primary canvass to each registered political party t h a t
participated in the primary not later t h a n the April 15 after the primary
election.
History: C. 1953, 20A-4-306, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 1, § 114; 1995, ch. 340, § 12; 1997,
ch. 183, § 9; 1999, ch. 22, § 13; 2002 (5th
S.S.), ch. 11, § 3; 200(5, ch. 355, § 4; 2007, ch.
75, § 18; 2008, ch. 225, § 6; 2009, ch. 202, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 2006 amendment, effective May 1, 2006, substituted kTuesday that falls two weeks after" for "third Thursday after" in Subsection (6)(a) and added "or
the following business day if April 15 foils on a
Saturday, Sunday, or a holiday" in Subsection
C6)(b).

The 2007 amendment, effective April 30,
2007, added Subsection (l)(c).
The 2008 amendment, effective May 5, 2008,
deleted "or the following business day if April
15 falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or a holiday* at
the end of (6)(b).
The 2009 amendment, effective May 12,
2009, substituted "day that falls seven days
after the last day on which a county canvass
may occur under Section 20A-4-301 for" for
"Tuesday that falls two weeks after" in the
introductory language of (6)(a).

PART 4
RECOUNTS AND ELECTION CONTESTS
20A-4-401.

Recounts — Procedure.

(1) (a) (i) For any regular primary, regular general, or municipal general
election, or the Western States Presidential primary, when any
candidate loses by not more t h a n a total of one vote per voting
precinct, the candidate may file a request for a recount within seven
days after the canvass with:
(A) the municipal clerk, if the election is a municipal election;
(B) the local district clerk, if the election is a local district
election;
(C) the county clerk, for races or ballot propositions voted on
entirely within a single county; or
(D) the lieutenant governor, for statewide races and ballot
propositions and for multicounty races and ballot propositions.
(ii) For any municipal primary election, when any candidate loses
by not more than a total of one vote per voting precinct, the candidate
may file a request for a recount with the appropriate election officer
within three days after the canvass,
(b) The election officer shall:
(i) supervise the recount;
(ii) recount all ballots cast for t h a t office;
(iii) reexamine all unopened absentee ballots to ensure compliance
with Chapter 3, Part 3, Absentee Voting; and
(iv) declare elected the person receiving the highest number of
votes on the recount.
(2) (a) Any 10 voters who voted in an election when any ballot proposition
or bond proposition was on the ballot may file a request for a recount with
the appropriate election officer within seven days of the canvass.
(b) The election officer shall:
(i) supervise the recount;
461
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20A-4-402

ELECTION CODE

(ii) recount all ballots cast for t h a t ballot proposition or bond
proposition;
(iii) reexamine all unopened absentee ballots to ensure compliance
with Chapter 3, P a r t 3, Absentee Voting; and
(iv) declare the ballot proposition or bond proposition to have
"passed" or "failed" based upon the results of the recount.
(c) Proponents and opponents of the ballot proposition or bond proposition may designate representatives to witness the recount.
(d) The voters requesting the recount shall pay the costs of the recount.
(3) Costs incurred by recount under Subsection (1) may not be assessed
against the person requesting the recount.
(4) (a) Upon completion of the recount, the election officer shall immediately convene the board of canvassers.
(b) The board of canvassers shall:
(i) canvass the election returns for the race or proposition t h a t was
the subject of the recount; and
(ii) with the assistance of the election officer, prepare and sign the
report required by Section 20A-4-304 or Section 20A-4-306.
(c) If the recount is for a statewide or multicounty race or for a
statewide proposition, the board of county canvassers shall prepare and
transmit a separate report to the lieutenant governor as required by
Subsection 20A-4-304(3).
(d) The canvassers' report prepared as provided in this Subsection (4) is
the official result of the race or proposition t h a t is the subject of the
recount.
History: C. 1953,20A-4-401, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 1, § 115; 1999, ch. 22, § 14; 1999,
-. h. 45, § 6; 2000, ch. 3, § 4; 2001, ch. 20, § 4;
2002, ch. 133, § 3; 2005, ch. 105, § 81; 2007,
ch. 329, § 382.

Amendment Notes. — The 2007 amendment, effective April 30, 2007, twice substituted
"local district" for "special district" in Subsection (l)(a)(i)(B).

20A-4-402. Election contests — Grounds,
(1) The election or nomination of any person to any public office, and the
declared result of the vote on any ballot proposition or bond proposition
submitted to a vote of the people may be contested according to the procedures
established in this part only:
(a) for malconduct, fraud, or corruption on the part of the judges of
election at any polling place, or of any board of canvassers, or any judge or
member of the board sufficient to change the result;
(b) when the person declared elected was not eligible for the office at the
time of the election;
(c) when the person declared elected has:
(i) given or offered to any registered voter, judge, or canvasser of
the election any bribe or reward in money, property, or anything of
value for the purpose of influencing the election; or
(ii) committed any other offense against the elective franchise;
(d) when illegal votes have been received or legal votes have been
rejected at the polls sufficient to change the result;
(e) for any error of any board of canvassers or judges of election in
counting the votes or declaring the result of the election, if the error would
change the result;
462
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ELECTION RETURNS AND ELECTION CONTESTS

20A-4-402

(f) when the election result would change because a sufficient number
of ballots containing uncorrected errors or omissions have been received at
the polls;
(g) when the candidate declared elected is ineligible to serve in the office
to which the candidate was elected;
(h) when an election judge or clerk was a party to malconduct, fraud, or
corruption sufficient to change the result of the election; and
(i) for any other cause that shows that another person was legally
elected.
(2) Any irregularity or improper conduct by the election judges does not void
an election unless the irregularity or improper conduct would result in the
election of a person who did not receive the highest number of legal votes.
(3) When any election held for any office is contested because of any
irregularity or improper conduct on the part of a judge of any voting precinct,
a court, upon proof of the irregularity or improper conduct may not set aside
the election unless the irregularity or improper conduct would change the
result for that office.
History: C. 1953,20A-4-402, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 1, § 116; 2005, ch. 105, § 82.
Cross-References. — Each house of legisla-

ture is judge of election and qualifications of its
members, Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 10.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
68 Utah 452, 250 P. 1049 (1926).

ANALYSIS

In general.
Generally, election may be contested only
upon grounds enumerated in statute. Payne v.
Hodgson, 34 Utah 296, 97 P. 132 (1908).

Annulment of election.
Evidence.
In general.
Local option election.
Marking of ballots.
Mistakes by voters.
Parties.
Pleadings.
Procedure.
Rejection of ballots.
Rejection of votes.
Remedies of successful candidate.

Local option election.
An election in a city to determine whether
sale of intoxicating liquors shall be authorized
or denied therein is an election within purview
of this provision because that is a "proposition
submitted to a vote of the people." Hardy v.
Beaver City, 41 Utah 80, 125 P. 679 (1912).

Annulment of election.
Election cannot stand if held or conducted in
violation of some express constitutional or statutory provision, or if result was affected by
commission or omission prohibited by law on
the part of the voters or if fraud, intimidation,
or other illegal methods were practiced. Hardy
v. Beaver City, 41 Utah 80, 125 P. 679 (1912).
Evidence.
In proceeding to contest election, evidence
held to sustain finding by trial court that defendant had not promised to appoint certain
person to offices if elected. Hamer v. Howell, 31
Utah 144, 86 P. 1073 (1906),
Equity courts have no inherent power to
inquire into political or quasi-political matters,
such as election contest, unless authorized to do
so by statute, and then only to extent and in
manner provided in statute. Ewing v. Harries,

Marking of ballots.
Complaint predicated upon ground that certain ballots were counted for contestee which,
because of their markings, should not have
been counted for any candidate under former
§ 20-7-21 was basis for successful election contest over office of city councilman to which three
candidates were to be elected. Johnstun v. Harrison, 114 Utah 94, 197 P2d 470 (1948).
Mistakes by voters.
Where two ballot boxes were placed side by
side, one for city and one for county tickets, and
by mistake several county tickets were placed
in the city ballot box, it was held that in spite of
an agreement entered into before the election
by all the judges of election and by all the
parties that in case of mistake in putting a
ballot in the wrong box it should not be counted,
they should nevertheless be counted, where it
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was not done through the fraud of the voters.
Young v. Deming, 9 Utah 204, 33 P. 818 (1893).
Parties.
Under the former local option laws, if a city
refused to defend a contest, an elector and
resident might do so. Beauregaard v. Gunnison
City, 48 Utah 515, 160 P. 815 (1916).
Pleadings.
The same general rule of civil pleading that
requires plaintiff to set forth in his complaint
the facts upon which he bases his right for relief
governs in election contests. It is not sufficient
to allege mere conclusions of law. Hamer v.
Howell, 31 Utah 144, 86 P. 1073 (1906).
In action to contest election, complaint that
was entirely barren of any fact or statement
that in any way tended to advise defendant
that contestant intended to question validity of
ballots objected to on any one or more of particular grounds upon which challenges were
based held insufficient. Hamer v. Howell, 31
Utah 144, 86 P. 1073 (1906).
While complaint in election contest failed to
allege sufficient facts to show cause of action as
to two grounds predicated upon failure to count
certain ballots for contestant, complaint was
sufficient as to third ground predicated upon
counting of certain ballots for contestee which,
because of their markings, should not have
been counted for any candidate under former
§ 20-7-21, so that overruling of general demurrer was proper. Johnstun v. Harrison, 114 Utah
94, 197 P2d 470 (1948).
Procedure.
While statutes governing contested elections
should be liberally construed in order that
justice may be done, this rule of liberal construction may not be extended so as to overturn
well-established rule of practice that evidence
must be confined to issues raised by pleadings,
and that judgment rendered must conform
hereto. Hamer v. Howell, 31 Utah 144, 86 P.
1073 (1906).

In election contest, contestant cannot question regularity or validity of proceedings of
conventions or committees in making or filing
nominations of candidates, nor can he in such
proceeding review the action of officer whose
duty it is to make up party tickets and from
them prepare the official ballot. Payne v.
Hodgson, 34 Utah 269, 97 P. 132 (1908).
Rejection of ballots.
Under former law the rejection of ballots cast
by voters because their names did not appear
on the registration list was not sufficient to
annul an election, even though if these votes
had been received and counted for contestant,
the result of the election would have been
different. Ferguson v. Allen, 7 Utah 263, 26 P.
570 (1891).
Rejection of votes.
An election cannot be annulled for alleged
improper rejection of votes if it does not appear
that such votes, if cast, would change the result. Ferguson v. Allen, 7 Utah 263, 26 P. 570
(1891).
Where ballots which ought to have been
counted in the result have been rejected in such
numbers that if cast for the contestant they
would have changed the result, yet where the
evidence is uncertain as to which candidate
received the ballots, the return of the judges of
election will not be disturbed. Young v. Deming,
9 Utah 204, 33 P. 818 (1893).
Remedies of successful candidate.
Plaintiff who received highest number of
votes in election was entitled to mandamus
compelling clerk to issue to him certificate of
election under former § 20-8-7, remedy under
former chapter being inadequate since relief
requested was issuance of certificate of election
and not declaration of right to office. Hill v.
Moss, 61 Utah 213, 211 P. 994 (1922); Howe v.
Moss, 61 Utah 222, 211 P. 998 (1922); Palmer v.
Board of County Canvassers, 111 Utah 144, 176
P2d 608 (1947).

20A-4-403. Election contest — P e t i t i o n a n d response.
(1) (a) In contesting the results of all elections, except for primary elections
and bond elections, a registered voter shall contest the right of any person
declared elected to any office by filing a verified written complaint with the
district court of the county in which he resides within 40 days after the
canvass,
(b) The complaint shall include:
(i) the name of the party contesting the election;
(ii) a statement that the party is a registered voter in the jurisdiction in which the election was held;
(hi) the name of the person whose right to the office is contested;
(iv) the office to which that person was ostensibly elected;
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(v) one or more of the grounds for an election contest specified in
Section 20A-4-402;
(vi) the person who was purportedly elected to the office as respondent; and
(vii) if the reception of illegal votes or the rejection of legal votes is
alleged as a ground for the contest, the name and address of all
persons who allegedly cast illegal votes or whose legal vote was
rejected.
(c) When the reception of illegal votes or the rejection of legal votes is
alleged as a cause of contest, it is sufficient to state generally that:
(i) illegal votes were given in one or more specified voting precincts
to a person whose election is contested, which, if taken from him,
would reduce the number of his legal votes below the number of legal
votes given to some other person for the same office; or
(ii) that legal votes for another person were rejected, which, if
counted, would raise the number of legal votes for that person above
the number of legal votes cast for the person whose election is
contested.
(d) (i) The court may not take or receive evidence of any of the votes
described in Subsection (l)(c) unless the party contesting the election
delivers to the opposite party, at least three days before the trial, a
written list of the number of contested votes and by whom the
contested votes were given or offered, which he intends to prove at
trial.
(ii) The court may not take or receive any evidence of contested
votes except those t h a t are specified in that list.
(2) (a) In contesting the results of a primary election, when contesting the
petition nominating an independent candidate, or when challenging any
person, election officer, election official, board, or convention for failing to
nominate a person, a registered voter shall contest the right of any person
declared nominated to any office by filing a verified written complaint
within 10 days after the date of the canvass for the primary election, after
the date of filing of the petition, or after the date of the convention,
respectively, with:
(i) the district court of the county in which he resides if he is
contesting a nomination made only by voters from that county; or
(ii) the Utah Supreme Court, if he is contesting a nomination made
by voters in more than one county,
(b) The complaint shall include:
(i) the name of the party contesting the nomination;
(ii) a statement that the contesting party is a registered voter in
the jurisdiction in which the election was held;
(iii) the name of the person whose right to nomination is contested
or the name of the person who failed to have their name placed in
nomination;
(iv) the office to which that person was nominated or should have
been nominated;
(v) one or more of the grounds for an election contest specified in
Subsection (1);
(vi) the person who was purportedly nominated to the office as
respondent; and
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(vii) if the reception of illegal votes or the rejection of legal votes is
alleged as a ground for the contest, the name and address of all
persons who allegedly cast illegal votes or whose legal vote was
rejected.
(c) When the reception of illegal votes or the rejection of legal votes is
alleged as a cause of contest, it is sufficient to state generally that:
(i) illegal votes were given to a person whose election is contested,
which, if taken from him, would reduce the number of his legal votes
below the number of legal votes given to some other person for the
same office; or
(ii) legal votes for another person were rejected, which, if counted,
would raise the number of legal votes for that person above the
number of legal votes cast for the person whose election is contested.
(d) (i) The court may not take or receive evidence of any the votes
described in Subsection (2)(c), unless the party contesting the election
delivers to the opposite party, at least three days before the trial, a
written list of the number of contested votes and by whom the
contested votes were given or offered, which he intends to prove at
trial.
(ii) The court may not take or receive any evidence of contested
votes except those that are specified in that list.
(3) (a) In contesting the results of a bond election, a registered voter shall
contest the validity of the declared results by filing a verified written
complaint with the district court of the county in which he resides within
40 days after the date of the official finding entered under Section
11-14-207.
(b) The complaint shall include:
(i) the name of the party contesting the election;
(ii) a statement that the party is a registered voter in the jurisdiction in which the election was held;
(iii) the bond proposition that is the subject of the contest;
(iv) one or more of the grounds for an election contest specified in
Section 20A-4-402; and
(v) if the reception of illegal votes or the rejection of legal votes is
alleged as a ground for the contest, the name and address of all
persons who allegedly cast illegal votes or whose legal vote was
rejected.
(c) When the reception of illegal votes or the rejection of legal votes is
alleged as a cause of contest, it is sufficient to state generally that:
(i) illegal votes were counted in one or more specified voting
precincts which, if taken out of the count, would change the declared
result of the vote on the proposition; or
(ii) legal votes were rejected in one or more specified voting
precincts, which, if counted, would change the declared result of the
vote on the proposition.
(d) (i) The court may not take or receive evidence of any of the votes
described in Subsection (3)(c) unless the party contesting the election
delivers to the opposite party, at least three days before the trial, a
written list of the number of contested votes and by whom the
contested votes were given or offered, which he intends to prove at
trial.
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(ii) The court may not take or receive any evidence of contested
votes except those that are specified in that list.
(4) The court may not reject any statement of the grounds of contest or
dismiss the proceedings because of lack of form, if the grounds of the contest
are alleged with such certainty as will advise the defendant gf the particular
proceeding or cause for whiqh the election is contested.
(5) (a) The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the respondent.
(b) (i) If the petitioner cannot obtain personal service of the petition on
the respondent, the petitioner may serve the respondent by leaving a
copy of the petition with the clerk of the court with which the petition
was filed.
(ii) The clerk shall make diligent inquiry and attempt to inform the
respondent t h a t he has five days to answer the complaint.
(c) The respondent shall answer the petition within five days after the
service.
(d) If the reception of illegal votes or the rejection of legal votes is
alleged as a ground for the contest, the defendant shall set forth in the
answer the name and address of all persons whom the defendant believes
were properly or improperly admitted or denied the vote.
(e) If the answer contains a counterclaim, the petitioner shall file a
reply within 10 days after service of the counterclaim.
(6) (a) The provisions of this Subsection (6) provide additional requirements that apply to municipal election contests that are in addition to the
other requirements of this section governing election contest.
(b) Municipal election contests shall be filed, tried, and determined in
the district court of the county in which the municipality is located.
(c) (i) As a condition precedent to filing a municipal election contest,
the petitioner shall file a written affidavit of intention to contest the
election with the clerk of the court within seven days after the votes
are canvassed.
(ii) The affidavit shall include:
(A) the petitioner's name;
(B) the fact that the petitioner is a qualified voter of the
municipality;
(C) the respondent's name;
(D) the elective office contested;
(E) the time of election; and
(F) the grounds for the contest.
(d) (i) Before the-district court takes jurisdiction of a municipal election
contest, the petitioner shall file a bond with the clerk of the court with
the sureties required by the court.
(ii) The bond shall name the respondent as obligee and be conditioned for the payment of all costs incurred by the respondent if the
respondent prevails.
History: C. 1953,20A-4-403, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 1, § 117; 2005, ch. 105, § 83; 2007,
ch. 238, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 2007 amendment, effective April 30, 2007, substituted the

language beginning "after the date of the canvass" for "from the date of the primary election,
filing of the petition, or date of the convention
with" at the end of introductory language in
Subsection (2)(a).
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Amendments.
__ .
0
Sufficiency of complaint.
me or n s .
Amendments.
If valid contest is filed within statutory limitation period, amendment respecting nonjurisdictional matters may be made after limitation
period. Ewing v. Harries, 68 Utah 452, 250 P.
1049 (1926).
Sufficiency of complaint.
Election contest under former § 20-15-5
predicated on alleged compulsion by church
respecting voting of its members, on ground
that such conduct was illegal, particularly in
view of Utah Const, Art. I, Sec. 4, forbidding
union of church and state, was maintainable.

Ewing v. Harries, 68 Utah 452, 250 P. 1049
(1926).
While complaint in election contest failed to
allege sufficient facts to s h o w c a u s e of a c t i o n a s

to two grounds predicated upon failure to count
certain ballots for contestant, complaint was
sufficient as to third ground predicated upon
counting of certain ballots for contestee which,
because of their markings, should not have
been counted for any candidate under former
§ 20-7-21, so that overruling of general demurrer was proper. Johnstun v. Harrison, 114 Utah
9 4 j 1 9 7 p2d 470 (1948).
Time for contest.
Election contest was untimely when brought
more than 40 days after the report to the board
of canvassers of the number of votes cast. Spear
v. Marshall, 95 Utah 62, 79 P.2d 15 (1938).

2QA-4-404. Election contest — Calendaring and disposition.
(1) (a) Upon receipt of the petition, the clerk shall inform the chief judge of
the court having jurisdiction.
(b) The chief judge shall issue an order:
(i) assigning the case to a district court judge, if the district court
has jurisdiction; and
(ii) setting a date and time, not less than 10 nor more than 30 days
from the date the petition was filed to hear and determine the contest.
(c) The clerk shall:
(i) issue a subpoena for the person whose right to the office is
contested to appear at the time and place specified in the order; and
(ii) cause the subpoena to be served.
(2) The court shall meet at the time and place designated to determine the
contest.
(3) (a) If it is necessary for the court to inspect the ballots of any voting
precinct in order to determine any election contest the judge may order the
proper officer to produce them.
(b) The judge shall:
(i) open and inspect the ballots in open court in the presence of the
parties or their attorneys; and
(ii) immediately after the inspection, seal them in an envelope and
return them, by mail or otherwise, to their legal custodian.
(4) (a) If the petition, response, or counterclaim alleges an error in the
canvass sufficient to change the result, the court may order and conduct a
recount of the ballots or vote tabulation.
(b) The court may also require the production of any documents,
records, and other evidence necessary to enable it to determine the legality
or illegality of any vote cast or counted.
(c) (i) After all the evidence in the contest is submitted, the court shall
enter its judgment, either confirming the election result or annulling
and setting aside the election.
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(ii) If the court determines that a person other than the one
declared elected received the highest number of legal votes, the court
shall declare t h a t person elected.
History: C. 1953, 20A-4-404, e n a c t e d by L.
1993, ch. 1, § 118.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

have been counted for any candidate under
former § 20-7-21 and official election watchers
[n voting districts testified that several of such
ballots were so counted, number of which was
sufficient to change result of election, court was
justified in ordering ballot pouches opened.
Johnstun v. Harrison, 114 Utah 94, 197 R2d
470 (1948)

Ballots as evidence.
Grounds for opening ballot pouches.
Verdict and findings.
_ „ ,
.,
Ballots as evidence
The burden of proof in all election contests is
upon the contestant who offers and relies upon
ballots to show that they have been kept and
preserved according to statutory requirements;
before ballots can be received in evidence it
must affirmatively appear from the testimony
that they have been so preserved. Farrell v.
Larsen, 26 Utah 283, 73 P. 227 (1903).

Verdict and findings.
In contest of election, wherein it was charged
that defendant, a candidate, made $10 contribution to one of judges of voting district for
political purposes, mere fact that defendant,
under direction of county chairman, handed his
campaign contribution to party to be taken to
precinct judge of election whom he erroneously
believed to be precinct chairman would not
sustain finding that defendant contributed
money for political purposes in manner not
sanctioned by law. Skewes v. Bliss, 58 Utah 51,
196 P. 850 (1921).

Grounds for opening ballot pouches.
Where complaint, in election contest over
office of city councilman to which three candidates were to be elected, sufficiently alleged
cause of action on ground that certain ballots
were counted for contestee which should not

20A-4-405. Election contests — Costs.
(1) The court shall enter judgment for costs against the party contesting the
election if:
(a) the proceedings are dismissed for:
(i) insufficiency of pleading or proof; or
(ii) want of prosecution; or
(b) the election is confirmed by the court.
(2) The court shall enter judgment for costs against the party whose election
was contested if the election is annulled and set aside.
(3) (a) Each party is liable for the costs of the officers and witnesses that
appeared on his behalf.
(b) The party may pay, and the officers and witnesses may collect, those
costs in the same manner as similar costs are paid and collected in other
cases.
History: C. 1953, 20A-4-405, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 1, § 119.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Allowance of costs.
Trial court properly allowed prevailing con-

testant his costs in election contest. Johnstun v.
Harrison, 114 Utah 94, 197 P.2d 470 (1948).
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20A-4-406. Election contests — Appeal.
(1) (a) Either party may appeal the district court's judgment to the Supreme Court as in other cases of appeal from the district court.
(b) When an appeal is taken, the district court may not stay execution
or proceedings, except execution for costs.
(2) Whenever an election is annulled or set aside by the judgment of a court
and no appeal is taken within 10 days, the certificate of election, if any has
been issued, is void, and the office is vacant.
History: C. 1953,20A-4-406, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 1, § 120.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Scope of review.
It was not necessary for Supreme Court on
appeal in election contest to determine whether
trial court erred in rejecting ballot because stub

had not been detached therefrom, because
countingof that ballot would not be sufficient to
change result. Johnstun v. Harrison, 114 Utah
94, 197 R2d 470 (1948).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 26 Am. Jur. 2d Elections
§ 381 et seq.

C.J.S. — 29 C.J.S. Elections § 401 et seq.

PART 5
OFFENSES INVOLVING ELECTION RETURNS
20A-4-501. Election returns — Forgery.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to:
(a) forge or counterfeit any election returns from any election purporting to have been held at any voting precinct where no election was in fact
held;
(b) willfully substitute any forged or counterfeit election returns in the
place of the true return for a voting precinct where any election was
actually held; or
(c) commit or cause any fraud in any election in any manner.
(2) Each person who violates this section may be sentenced to imprisonment
in the state prison for a term of not less than two nor more than 10 years.

<

{

History: C. 1953,20A-4-501, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 1, § 121.

20A-4-502. Altering vote count or returns.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to:
(a) willfully add to or subtract from the votes actually cast at an election
in any election returns; or
(b) alter any election returns.
(2) Any person who violates this section may be sentenced to imprisonment
in the state prison for not less than one nor more than five years.
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20A-I'70!8

20A-1-703

rriM'rrdinuis i>y r e g i s t e r e d v o t e r ,

(1) Any registered voter who has information that any provisions of this title
have been violated by any candidate for whom the registered voter had the
right to vote, by any personal campaign committee of t h a t candidate, by any
member of that committee, or by any election official, may file a verified
petition with the lieutenant governor.
(2) (a) The lieutenant governor shall gather information and determine if a
special investigation is necessary.
(b) If the lieutenant governor determines that a special investigation is
necessary, the lieutenant governor shall refer the information to the
attorney general, who shall:
(i) bring a special proceeding to investigate and determine whether
or not there has been a violation; and
(ii) appoint special counsel to conduct that proceeding on behalf of
the state.
(3) If it appears from the petition or otherwise that sufficient evidence is
obtainable to show t h a t there is probable cause to believe that a violation has
occurred, the attorney general shall:
(a) grant leave to bring the proceeding; and
(b) appoint special counsel to conduct the proceeding.
(4) (a) If leave is granted, the registered voter may, by a special proceeding
brought in the district court in the name of the state upon the relation of
the registered voter, investigate and determine whether or not the
candidate, candidate's personal campaign committee, any member of the
candidate's personal campaign committee, or any election officer has
violated any provision of this title.
(b) (i) In the proceeding, the complaint shall:
(A) be served with the summons; and
(B) set forth the name of the person or persons who have
allegedly violated this title and the grounds of those violations in
detail.
(ii) The complaint may not be amended except by leave of the court,
(iii) The summons and complaint in the proceeding shall be filed
with the court no later than five days after they are served.
(c) (i) The answer to the complaint shall be served and filed within 10
days after the service of the summons and complaint.
(ii) Any allegation of new matters in the answer shall be considered
controverted by the adverse party without reply, and the proceeding
shall be considered at issue and stand ready for trial upon five days'
notice of trial.
(d) (i) All proceedings initiated under this section have precedence over
any other civil actions.
(ii) The court shall always be considered open for the trial of the
issues raised in this proceeding.
(iii) The proceeding shall be tried and determined as a civil action
without a jury, with the court determining all issues of fact and issues
of law.
(iv) If more than one proceeding is pending or the election of more
than one person is investigated and contested, the court may:
(A) order the proceedings consolidated and heard together; and
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(B) equitably apportion costs and disbursements.
(e) (i) Either party may request a change of venue as provided by law
in civil actions, but application for a change of venue must be made
within five days after service of summons and complaint.
(ii) The judge shall decide the request for a change of venue and
issue any necessary orders within three days after the application is
made.
(iii) If a party fails to request a change of venue within five days of
service, he has waived his right to a change of venue.
(f) (i) If judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, the relator may petition
the judge to recover his taxable costs and disbursements against the
person whose right to the office is contested.
(ii) The judge may not award costs to the defendant unless it
appears that the proceeding was brought in bad faith.
(iii) Subject to the limitations contained in Subsection (4)(f), the
judge may decide whether or not to award costs and disbursements.
(5) Nothing in this section may be construed to prohibit any other civil or
criminal actions or remedies against alleged violators.
(6) In the event a witness asserts a privilege against self-incrimination,
testimony and evidence from the witness may be compelled pursuant to Title
77, Chapter 22b, Grants of Immunity.
History: C. 1953,20A-1-703, enacted by L.
1993, eh. 1, § 46; 1996, ch. 258, § 4; 1997, ch.
296, § 5; 2010, ch. 324, § 50.

Amendment Notes. — The 2010 amendment, effective May 11, 2010, substituted "Subsection (4)(f)" for "Subsection (f)" in (4)(f )(iii).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Complaint.
In contest of election, complaint charging
that defendant, a candidate, contributed $10 to
judge of voting district for political purposes

held sufficient to advise defendant as to what
he had to meet and to confer jurisdiction upon
court. Skewes v. Bliss, 58 Utah 51, 196 P. 850
(1921).

20A-1-704. Judgment and findings — Appeal — Criminal
prosecution not affected by judgment.
(1) (a) If the court finds that the candidate whose right to any office is being
investigated, or that the candidate, the candidate's personal campaign
committee or any member of the candidate's personal campaign committee
has violated any provision of this title in the conduct of the campaign for
nomination or election, and if the candidate is not one mentioned in
Subsection (2), the judge shall enter an order:
(i) declaring void the election of the candidate to that office;
(ii) ousting and excluding the candidate from office; and
(iii) declaring the office vacant,
(b) The vacancy created by that order shall be filled as provided in this
chapter.
(2) (a) If a proceeding has been brought to investigate the right of a
candidate for either house of the Legislature, and the court finds that the
candidate, the candidate's personal campaign committee, or any member
of the candidate's personal campaign committee has violated any provision
of this title in the conduct of the campaign for nomination or election, the
court shall:
370
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Part XII. Family Law

Part DL Attorneys

Rule
100. Coordination of cases pending in district
court and juvenile court.
101. Motion practice before court commissioners.
102. Motion and order for payment of costs and
fees.
10a. Repealed.
104. Divorce decree upon affidavit.
105. Shortening 90-day waiting period in domestic matters.
106. Modification of final domestic relations
order.
107. Decree of adoption; Petition to open adoption records.

Rule
73. Attorney fees.
74. Withdrawal of counsel.
75. Limited appearance.
Part X. D i s t r i c t C o u r t s a n d C l e r k s
76. Notice of contact information change.
77. District courts and clerks.
78 to 80. Repealed.
Part XI. General Provisions
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

4

Applicability of rules in general,
Jurisdiction and venue unaffected.
Repealed.
Forms.
Title.

Appendix of Forms
Index to Rules

PAKT I. SCOPE OF RULES — ONE FORM OF ACTION
Rule 1. General provisions.
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the procedure in the courts of the
state of Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil nature, whether
cognizable at law or in equity, and in all special statutory proceedings, except
as governed by other rules promulgated by this court or enacted by the
Legislature and except as stated in Rule 81. They shall be liberally construed
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.
(b) Effective date. These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1950; and
thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect.
They govern all proceedings in actions brought after they take effect and also
all further proceedings in actions then pending, except to the extent that in the
opinion of the court their application in a particular action pending when the
rules take effect would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event
the former procedure applies.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987; November 1, 1996; April 1, 2003; April 1,
2008.)
Advisory C o m m i t t e e N o t e . — These rules
apply to court commissioners to the same extent as to judges.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 2008 amendment deleted former Subdivision (c), which
read: "Electronic filing. Notwithstanding these
rules, the court may permit electronic transactions among the parties with the court in courtsupervised pilot projects approved by the Judicial Council."
C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . — This rule is substantially similar to Rules 1 and 86(a), F.R.C.R,

except that it has been adapted to procedure of
this state.
Cross-References. — Children's cases
deemed civil proceedings, § 78A-6-116.
Jurisdiction and venue of courts unaffected
by rules, U.R.C.P. 82.
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, district
courts, juvenile courts, and justice courts, Title
78A, Chapters 3 through 7.
Supreme Court rulemaking, § 78A-3-103.
United States, execution of process on land
acquired by, §§ 63L-1-201, 63L-1-203.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Applicability.
—Administrative body.
Federal rules.
Noncompliance.
Cited.

apply to a proceeding before an administrative
body seeking to regulate activities burdened
with a public interest. Entre Nous Club v.
Toronto, 4 Utah 2d 98, 287 P.2d 670 (1955).

Federal rules.
Since these rules were fashioned after the
— A d m i n i s t r a t i v e body.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is proper to
by the do
Howard
Hunter Lawdecisions
Library, J. Reuben
School,
BYU.to
The Utah Rules of CivilDigitized
Procedure
not W. examine
under Clark
the Law
federal
rules
Applicability.
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determine the meanings thereof. Winegar v.
Slim Olson, Inc., 122 Utah 487, 252 P 2 d 205
(1953) (construing Rule 41).
Noncompliance.
Noncompliance with rules is allowed only
when some inadvertence, surprise, excusable
neglect, or mistake has occurred, and deviation
is required for substantial justice to be done.
Holton v. Holton, 121 Utah 451, 243 P 2 d 438
(1952).

Rule 2

Cited in Howard v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149,
356 P 2 d 275 (1960); State v. Geurts, 11 Utah 2d
345, 359 R2d 12 (1961); State ex rel. Road
Comm'n v. Petty, 17 Utah 2d 382, 412 P2d 914
(1966); Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189,429 P2d
39 (1967); Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548
P2d 238 (Utah 1976); Dixon v. Stoddard, 765
P 2 d 879 (Utah 1988); Hunter v. Sunrise Title
Co., 2004 UT 1, 491 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 84 P.3d
1163.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d.
seq.

- 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 48 et

C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 124 et seq.

Rule 2. One form of action*
There shall be one form of action to be known as "civil action."
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is identical
in substance to Rule 2, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References.
— Class
actions,
U.R.C.R 23.
Consolidation of actions for joint hearing or
trial, U.R.C.P. 42(a).

Joinder of claims in a single action, U.R.C.P.
18.
Special forms of writs abolished, U.R.C.P.
65B(a).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Forms of action.
—Common-law names.
—Defective answer.
Law and equity.
—Acceleration clause.
—Equitable defenses.
— Relief granted.
Cited.

Inv. Corp. v. Radmall, 26 Utah 2d 124, 485 P2d
1402 (1971).

Forms of action.
—Common-law names.
The common-law names applied to the various actions or remedies no longer have any
practical force or effect, except when the court
is called upon to give effect to a particular
statute. O'Neill v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R.R.,
38 Utah 475, 114 P. 127 (1911).
—Defective a n s w e r .
The abolition of forms of action and pleadings
did not cure an answer so defective that plaintiff could not traverse it. Baskin v. Godbe, 1
Utah 28 (1876).
Law and equity.
Pursuant to this rule, equitable principles
may be applied in an action at law. Marlowe

—Acceleration clause.
Rigid enforcement of acceleration clause in
note following acceptance of late payments requires reasonable notice and opportunity to
comply; this equitable doctrine applies to all
controversies under former Utah Const., Article
VIII, Sec. 19, which is implemented by this
rule. Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 P. 2d 1145
(Utah 1976).
—Equitable d e f e n s e s .
Equitable defenses are authorized against
legal claims. Columbia Trust Co. v. Anglum, 63
Utah 353, 225 P. 1089 (1924).
—Relief granted.
Court could administer relief according to
nature of cause, whether it would have been
granted in equity or at law. Morgan v. Child,
Cole & Co., 47 Utah 417, 155 P. 451 (1916);
Jenkins v. Nicolas, 63 Utah 329, 226 P. 177
(1924); Trenchard v. Reay, 70 Utah 19, 257 P.
1046 (1927); Wasatch Oil Ref. Co. v. Wade, 92
Utah 50, 63 P.2d 1070 (1936).
Cited in Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144
(Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 1 Am. Jur. 2d Actions § 8 et
seq.

C.J.S. — 1 C.J.S. Actions §§ 55 to 57.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 20 et
seq.; 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions, Rules, and Orders
§ 10; 62B Am. Jur. 2d Process §§ 114-117,
227-229.
C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders § 8;
66 C.J.S. Notice § 27 et seq.; 71 C.J.S. Pleading
§§ 98, 114, 219; 72 C.J.S. Process §§ 72, 78.
A.L.R. — Vacating judgment or granting new
trial in civil case, consent as ground of after
expiration of term or time prescribed by statute
or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191.
Attorney's inaction as excuse for failure to
timely prosecute action, 15 A.L.R.3d 674.

Validity of service of summons or complaint
on Sunday or holiday, 63 A.L.R.3d 423.
Amendment, after expiration of time for filing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845.
Consequences of prosecution's failure to file
timely brief in appeal by accused, 27 A.L.R.4th
213.
What constitutes bringing an action to trial
or other activity in case sufficient to avoid
dismissal under state statute or court rule
requiring such activity within stated time, 32
A.L.R.4th 840.

PART III. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS
Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda, hearings, orders.
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a
counterclaim; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-claim;
a third-party complaint, if a person who was not an original party is summoned
under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third-party answer, if a third-party
complaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court
may order a reply to an answer or a third-party answer.
(b)(1) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion
which, unless made during a hearing or trial or in proceedings before a court
commissioner, shall be made in accordance with this rule. A motion shall be in
writing and state succinctly and with particularity the relief sought and the
grounds for the relief sought.
(b)(2) Limit on order to show cause. An application to the court for an order
to show cause shall be made only for enforcement of an exiting order or for
sanctions for violating an existing order. An application for an order to show
cause must be supported by an affidavit sufficient to show cause to believe a
party has violated a court order.
(c) Memoranda.
(c)(1) Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times. All motions, except
uncontested or ex parte motions, shall be accompanied by a supporting
memorandum. Within ten days after service of the motion and supporting
memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in
opposition. Within five days after service of the memorandum in opposition,
the moving party may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited to
rebuttal of matters raised in the memorandum in opposition. No other
memoranda will be considered without leave of court. A party may attach a
proposed order to its initial memorandum.
(c)(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages of argument
without leave of the court. Reply memoranda shall not exceed 5 pages of
argument without leave of the court. The court may permit a party to file an
over-length memorandum upon ex parte application and a showing of good
cause.
(c)(3) Content
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall
contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no
genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery
materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
responding party.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall
contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts t h a t is
controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in
dispute. For each of the moving party's facts t h a t is controverted, the opposing
party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by
citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For
any additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be
separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to supporting
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials.
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more t h a n 10 pages of argument shall contain
a table of contents and a table of authorities with page references.
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions
of documents cited in the memorandum, such as affidavits or discovery
materials.
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, either party
may file a "Request to Submit for Decision." The request to submit for decision
shall state the date on which the motion was served, the date the opposing
memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was
served, and whether a hearing has been requested. If no party files a request,
the motion will not be submitted for decision.
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion. A party may
request a hearing in the motion, in a memorandum or in the request to submit
for decision. A request for hearing shall be separately identified in the caption
of the document containing the request. The court shall grant a request for a
hearing on a motion under Rule 56 or a motion that would dispose of the action
or any claim or defense in the action unless the court finds t h a t the motion or
opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively
decided.
(f) Orders.
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute
order entered in writing, not included in a judgment. An order for the payment
of money may be enforced in the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except
as otherwise provided by these rules, any order made without notice to the
adverse party may be vacated or modified by the judge who made it with or
without notice. Orders shall state whether they are entered upon trial,
stipulation, motion or the court's initiative.
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an
initial memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing
party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other
parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to
the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The party
preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an
objection or upon expiration of the time to object.
(f)(3) Unless otherwise directed by the court, all orders shall be prepared as
separate documents and shall not incorporate any matter by reference.
(Amended effective November 1, 2003; April 1, 2004; November 1, 2005; April
1, 2008; November 1, 2009.)
nated former Subdivision (b) as Subdivision
Advisory Committee Note. — The practice
(b)(1).
for courtesy copies varies by judge and so is not
The 2009 amendment deleted former Subdiregulated by rule. Each party should ascertain
whether the judge wants a courtesy copy of that vision (g), providing for the effect of and objecparty's motion, memoranda and supporting tions to recommendations of court commissiondocuments and, if so, when and where to de- ers.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
liver them.
Rule 7, F.R.C.P.
Paragraph (f) applies to all orders, not just
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter
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Commencement of action, U.R.C.R 3.
Consolidation of defenses made by motion,
U.R.C.R 12(g).
Counterclaim and cross-claim, U.R.C.R 13.
Defenses and objections, U.R.C.R 12.
Denial of motion, pleading after, U.R.C.R
12(i).
Directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, motion for, U.R.C.R 50*
Dismissal of actions, U.R.C.R 41.
Eminent domain proceedings, contents of
complaint in, § 78B-6-507.
Evidence in support of motion, U.R.C.R
43(b).
Execution and proceedings supplemental
thereto, U.R.C.R 69A et seq.
Extraordinary relief, U.R.C.R 65B.

Zrj

Forcible entry or detainer, proof required,
§ 78B-6-809.
Form of pleadings, U.R.C.R 10.
"Judgment" denned, U.R.C.R 54(a).
One form of action, U.R.C.R 2.
Partition of property, complaint to set forth
interests of all parties, § 78B-6-1202.
Pleading special matters, U.R.C.R 9.
Relief from judgment or order, U.R.C.R 60.
Requirements of signature, U.R.C.R 11.
Service and filing of motions, pleadings and
other papers, U.R.C.R 5.
Special forms of writs abolished, U.R.C.R
65B(a).
Temporary restraining orders, setting aside,
U.R.C.R 65A.
Time for service of written motions, U.R.C.R
6(d).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Memorandum opposing summary judgment.
Motions.
—Amendments.
Complaint.
Prayer for relief.
—New trial.
Particularization.
—Setting aside conditional order.
Orders.
—Correction.
—Necessity.
—Submission to court.
Reply memorandum.
Cited.

Motions.
—Amendments.
Complaint.
Investors who lost money in a failed investment venture and whose multi-count complaint
stemming from their losses was dismissed were
properly denied the opportunity to amend their
complaint because they never filed an actual
motion, but merely cited Rule 15 without articulating any reasons why leave to amend their
136-page, 725-paragraph complaint was merited. Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, 485
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 79 R3d 974.

Prayer for relief.
Memorandum opposing summary judgAlthough a trial court may deny a motion to
ment.
amend the complaint for a movant's failure to
Failure of memorandum opposing summary
present a written motion and a proposed
judgment to set forth disputed facts in numamended complaint, that rule does not apply to
bered sentences in a separate section as re- the prayer for relief because, under Rule 54(c),
quired by former R. Jud. Admin. 4-501(2)(B) the prayer does not limit the relief which the
was harmless, as the disputed facts were court may grant. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills
clearly provided in the body of the memoran- Hosp., 675 R2d 1179 (Utah 1983).
dum with applicable record references. Salt
Lake County v. Metro W. Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 — N e w trial.
UT 23, 89 R3d 155.
Because defendant's memorandum and atParticularization.
tachments did not provide a basis for a material
Only purpose for requiring particularization
dispute of fact and neither technically nor sub- of grounds for motion for new trial is to inform
stantially complied with this rule, trial court court and other party of theories upon which
properly deemed the plaintiffs' claimed facts new trial is sought; where defendant filed affiuncontroverted. Jennings Inv., LC v. Dixie Rid- davit with motions setting forth theories, and
ing Club, Inc., 2009 UT App 119, 208 P.3d 1077, judgment had been on pleadings, court and
cert, denied, 215 R3d 161, (Utah 2009).
parties were sufficiently advised as to grounds
In a case seeking dedication to the public of a for motion. Howard v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149,
private road, the trial court did not err in
356 R2d 275 (1960).
granting a cross-motion for summary judgment
in favor of several plaintiffs because defendant —Setting aside conditional order.
property owner failed to substantially comply
Where court on own initiative lowered from
with this rule; the owner's opposing memoran- $2,000 to $1,000 value of building as found by
dum did not contain a verbatim restatement of jury and entered conditional order granting
each of the facts that the owner sought to new trial unless plaintiff consented to reduccontest, and the trial court properly considered tion, court could restore jury findings under
whether the facts deemed admitted met the authority of this Rule, since plaintiff filed moplaintiffs' burden of proof. Jennings Inv., LC v. tion to set aside conditional order for new trial
Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 2009 UT App 119, 208 within ten days. National Farmers' Union
P.3d 1077, cert, denied, 215
R3d by161,
(UtahW. Hunter
Digitized
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Law &
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Orders.
—Correction.
Where judge made perfunctory or clerical
mistake resulting from erroneous assumption
that order prepared by counsel correctly reflected judgment of Supreme Court and trial
court, judge could correct order on his own
motion. Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 5 Utah 2d
196, 299 P.2d 827 (1956).

Rule 8

defendant failed to meet its burden, plaintiff
acted appropriately in preparing the order.
Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2,
201 R3d 966.

—Necessity.
Unless the court explicitly directs that no
order needs to be submitted, no finality will be
ascribed to a memorandum decision or minute
entry for purposes of triggering the running of
the time for appeal. Code v. Utah Dep't of
Health, 2007 UT 43, 162 P.3d 1097.

Reply memorandum.
District court had the discretion to consider
points raised in a reply memorandum submitted in support of summary judgment although
the original motion addressed only one cause of
action, but other causes of action were addressed in the reply. No supplemental briefing
was filed after the moving party stated it was
seeking summary judgment on all of the claims,
despite a request for leave to supplement an
opposition document. Dimick v. OHC Liquidation Trust, 2007 UT App 73, 572 Utah Adv. Rep.
21, 157 R3d 347.

— S u b m i s s i o n to court.
If the prevailing party fails to submit an
order within the 15-day period required by this
rule, any party interested in finality, including
the non-prevailing party, may submit an order.
Code v. Utah Dep't of Health, 2007 UT 43, 162
P.3d 1097.
After entry of orders granting summary judgment, dismissing plaintiff's claims, and denying defendant's request for attorney fees, a
separate order was required under this rule.
Because no proposed order was submitted with
an initial memorandum, and the court did not
direct the parties that no additional order was
necessary, the burden was on defendant, as the
prevailing party, to prepare the order. When

Cited in Boskovich v. Utah Constr. Co., 123
Utah 387, 259 P.2d 885 (1953); Thomas v. Heirs
of Braffet, 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P.2d 507 (1956);
Holmes Dev, LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, 48 P.3d
895; Code v. Utah Dep't of Health, 2006 UT App
113, 133 P.3d 438; Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41,
578 Utah Adv. Rep. 31, 164 P.3d 366; Tuttle v.
Olds, 2007 UT App 10, 569 Utah Adv. Rep. 10,
155 R3d 893; Heideman v. Washington City,
2007 UT App 11, 155 P.3d 900; Victor Plastering, Inc. v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 2009 UT
App 98; Express Recovery Servs. v. Hester,
2009 UT App 94; Cheap-O-Rooter, Inc. v. Marmalade Square Condo. Homeowners Ass'n,
2009 UT App 329, 643 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 221
P3d 898.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions,
Rules, and Orders § 1 et seq.; 61AAm. Jur. 2d
Pleading §§ 31 et seq., 665.
C.J.S. — 60 C J . S . Motions and Orders § 1 et
seq.; 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 63 to 210, 140 et
seq., 211 et seq.
A.L.R. — Proceeding for summary judgment

as affected by presentation of counterclaim, 8
A.L.R.3d 1361.
Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action as
affected by opponent's motion for summary
judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or directed verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113.

Rule 8. General rules of pleadings.
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether
an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain
(1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing t h a t the pleader is entitled
to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems
himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be
demanded.
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms his
defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon
which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the t r u t h of an averment, he shall so state and
this h a s the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of the
averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or
a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and
material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good
faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he may make
his denials as specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or he
may generally deny all the
averments
designated
averments
or
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eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 A.L.R. Fed.
107.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions
for defamation, 95 A.L.R. Fed. 181.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fedi V> i
r n- i r>
J
^ • •
4.
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in action
for wrongful discharge from employment, 96
A L R Fed. 13.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions

46

for securities fraud, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 107.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fede r a i Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions
for
i n n i c t i o n of emotional distress, 98 A.L.R.
p e ( j 442
.'.
«
,.
J r> 1 11 1? J
T"
Imposition ol sanctions under Rule 11, fed, V> ,
r C#-•• 1-i n
J
J. - ' I
eral Rules
.
/
™ Procedure, pertaining to
S1 m
and
^ g
verification of pleadings, in antit r u s t actions
> " A.L.R. Fed. 573.
Procedural requirements for imposition of
sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 100 A.L.R. Fed. 556.

Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(a) Whe?i presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the
court, a defendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service
of the summons and complaint is complete within the state and within thirty
days after service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state.
A party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer
thereto within twenty days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply
to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the answer
or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service of the
order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this
rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by
order of the court, but a motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a
pleading does not affect the time for responding to the remaining claims:
(a)(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days
after notice of the court's action;
(a)(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the
more definite statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion:
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the
person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of
service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
(7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these
defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses
or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the
denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to
which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the
adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim
for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for
failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court,
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on
the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside
the pleadings are presented
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court,Clark
theLaw
motion
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56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders
t h a t the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous t h a t a party cannot reasonably
be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more
definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall
point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is
granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of
the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike
the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems
just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court
may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule
may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available. If a
party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses
and objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion,
the party shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or
objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not
presented either by motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure
to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal
defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or
by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and
except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise
t h a t the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss
the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as
provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received.
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after
the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a
waiver of such motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination
by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff.
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the
United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990; November 1, 2000.)
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Standard of review.
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— Court's initiative.
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— Opportunity to present pertinent material.
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—Statute of frauds.
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Cited.

jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant in
order to proceed to trial on the merits. Anderson v. American Soc'y of Plastic Surgeons, 807
P.2d 825 (Utah 1990), cert, denied, 502 U.S.
900, 112 S. Ct. 276, 116 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1991).
Trial court erred in granting a Nevada casino's motion to dismiss a Utah patron's personal
injury suit, where the patron's complaint alleged sufficient facts to support general personal jurisdiction over the casino by the State of
Utah. Ho v. Jim's Enters., Inc., 2001 UT 63, 29
P.3d 633.
Motion for judgment on pleadings.
Motion for judgment on the pleadings to
decide upon distribution of trust assets was
inappropriate in a proceeding among trust beneficiaries to determine distribution and offsets.
Cafferty v. Hughes, 2002 UT App 105, 46 P.3d
233, aff'd, 2004 UT 22, 89 P3d 148.
Trial court properly granted judgment on the
pleadings to defendant restaurants in wrongful
death action alleging negligence and negligence
per se against the restaurants for furnishing
alcohol to decedent, plaintiffs' son, who later
died when he lost control of his car, because
Utah does not recognize a common-law, firstparty action against dramshops for injuries
suffered by an intoxicated person. Miller v.
Gastronomy, Inc., 2005 UT App 80, 110 P.3d
144.
—Matters outside of pleadings.
Answers to interrogatories.
Answers to interrogatories are not a part of
the pleadings for purposes of judgment on the
pleadings and if the court considers them the
other party must have the privilege of offering
answering affidavits as upon a motion for summary judgment. Securities Credit Corp. v.
Willey, 1 Utah 2d 254, 265 P2d 422 (1953).
Rights of opposing party.
On review of a motion on the pleadings
treated as a motion for summary judgment
under Subdivision (c), the party against whom
the judgment has been granted is entitled to
have all the facts presented, and all the inferences fairly arising therefrom, considered in a
light most favorable to him. Young v. Texas Co.,
8 Utah 2d 206, 331 P2d 1099 (1958).
Motion for more definite statement.
—Bill of particulars.
A motion for a more definite statement, and
not discovery procedures, is the appropriate
means of obtaining the information formerly
sought by a bill of particulars. Securities Credit
Corp. v. Willey, 1 Utah 2d 254, 265 P2d 422
(1953).

—Criteria.
A motion for a more definite statement is
Jurisdiction over the p e r s o n .
properly made only when the complaint is inWhen urging the trial court to exercise per- definite, ambiguous, or vague in either factual
sonal jurisdiction based only on documentary
allegations or legal theory to such an extent
the Howard
W. Hunter
J. Reuben
Law School,
BYU. be
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quor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 121 Utah 457,
243 R2d 441 (1952).
—Motion to dismiss distinguished.
Where the complaint states a claim in general language but is not sufficiently definite in
certain respects to enable defendant to answer,
the proper remedy is a motion for a more
definite statement, not a motion to dismiss.
Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 121 Utah 457,
243 P.2d 441 (1952).
—Purpose.
Delay.
A motion for a more definite statement
should be summarily dealt with if made for the
purpose of delay. Liquor Control Comm'n v.
Athas, 121 Utah 457, 243 P.2d 441 (1952).
Obtaining evidence.
Motions for a more definite statement are not
properly used to obtain evidence from the
pleader. Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 121
Utah 457, 243 P2d 441 (1952).
Motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.
—Conversion.
Trial court erroneously characterized defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion as one for a judgment on the pleadings, which was improper
because defendants' memorandum and attachments were not pleadings. Because the plaintiffs stated a claim for negligence upon which
relief could be granted, the dismissal of that
claim could not be justified under Rule 12(b)(6).
The court should have converted the motion
into one for summary judgment. Tuttle v. Olds,
2007 UT App 10, 569 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 155
P3d 893.
—Explained.
A motion to dismiss under Subdivision (b)(6)
admits the facts alleged in the complaint but
challenges the plaintiff's right to relief based on
those facts. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P2d 194 (Utah 1991); Russell
v. Standard Corp., 898 P 2 d 263 (Utah 1995).
—Habeas corpus.
Although Rule 65B generally governs the
drafting, filing, and disposition of habeas corpus petitions, Subdivision (b)(6) of this rule
applies to habeas corpus petitions in which
petitioner fails to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. Alvarez v. Galetka, 933
P.2d 987 (Utah 1997).
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American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218
(Utah 1996).
Complaint for wrongful death, alleging that
the injuries and death occurred because of a
defective irrigation ditch and its associated
channelling devices, bridges, currents, and
trappings and that as a further direct and
proximate result of the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of the irrigation ditch,
plaintiffs suffered damages for loss of financial
support, comfort, society, advice, care, companionship, affection and happiness of association
of the decedent, contained allegations of causation sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910
R2d 1218 (Utah 1996).
The trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's case because her allegation of facts concerning each element of the claim of breach of
contract was sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss. Mackey v. Cannon, 996 P2d 1081
(Utah Ct. App. 2000).
Representative's case was improperly dismissed because her complaint was sufficient
and the defendants below never argued that
the complaint was inadequate; the trial court
inappropriately relied on factual determinations from the evidentiary hearing to dismiss
the case. Cazares v. Cosby, 2003 UT 3, 65 P3d
1184.
Trial court erred in dismissing claims for
fraud, concealment, and other intentional torts
on the grounds that they were barred by the
applicable statutes of limitations in Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78-12-25(3) and 78-12-26(3). Whether
the plaintiff made a prima facie showing that a
reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered
the claims earlier was a factual finding that
should be decided by a jury, not a judge. Russell/Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2003 UT App
316, 482 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 78 P3d 616, aff'd,
2005 UT 14, 108 P.3d 741.
Dismissal under Subdivision (b)(6) of claim
for injuries suffered at a state liquor store was
improper; the claim did provide a brief statement of the facts as required by the relevant
governmental immunity provision. Peeples v.
State, 2004 UT App 328, 509 Utah Adv. Rep. 16,
100 P.3d 254.
—Negligence.
To bring a successful negligence claim, a
plaintiff must establish, among other things,
that the defendant owed a duty of care to the
plaintiff, and failure to show a duty is fatal to a
negligence claim. Thus, dismissal under Subdivision (b)(6) is proper when a plaintiff has
complained of negligence, but no factual situation could possibly create a legal duty of care
between the defendant and plaintiff. Williams
v. Bench, 2008 UT App 306, 193 P.3d 640.

— Improper.
Dismissal of defendant's counterclaim was
reversed because the record did not persuade
the appeals court that there was no set of facts
under which the defendant might succeed. Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 R2d 1356 —Parties.
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (claim of unjust enrichAdoption agencies' declaratory judgment acment if no reimbursement for payment made tion against an association that had issued an
on loan guarantee).
advisory opinion on the applicability of an inIn a wrongful death action based on attrac- terstate compact failed to state a claim against
tive nuisance doctrine, the term "aquatic trap" the association because, although the associaDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
in complaint could reasonably be construed to tion's position was adopted by state officials, its
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2004 UT App 488, 516 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 106
P.3d 744.
—Proper.
Trial court did not err in granting bank's
motion to dismiss under Subdivision (b)(6)
where the plaintiff's complaint failed to allege
sufficient facts to support a negligence action;
the depository bank did not owe the plaintiff, as
a non-customer of the bank, a duty of care after
another person forged the plaintiff's signature
and deposited the checks at the bank. Ramsey
v. Hancock, 2003 UT App 319, 483 Utah Adv.
Rep. 10, 79 P.3d 423.
Trial court properly dismissed a complaint
that was entirely and exclusively dependent on
the plaintiff's misunderstanding of the defendant's legal obligations toward her and that
failed to plead a cognizable and actionable
claim. Pett v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 2004 UT App
150, 91 R3d 854.
Patient's claim was properly dismissed because the patient's risk of recurrence of breast
cancer was not an injury; the patient's claim for
the increased risk of recurrence of cancer was
not actionable. Medved v. Glenn, 2004 UT App
161, 499 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 92 R3d 176.
Church's motion to dismiss was granted in a
negligence case because it had no common law
duty to warn abuse victims about a priest's
prior child sexual abuse. There was no special
relationship between the parties giving rise to
such a duty, the abuse did not occur on church
property or during church functions, and the
priest was not a church employee, agent, or
clergy member. Doe v. Corp. of the President of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints, 2004 UT App 274, 506 Utah Adv. 25, 98
P3d 429, cert, denied, 106 P3d 743 (Utah
2004).
Business's complaint against the Utah Department of Transportation, following the closure of an access route to the business during a
highway reconstruction project, failed to state a
claim for inverse condemnation under Utah
Const., Art. I, § 22; the business did not have a
protectable property interest in an easement of
access through the blocked routes and the business was accessible from another route during
the reconstruction project. Intermountain
Sports, Inc. v. DOT, 2004 UT App 405, 512 Utah
Adv. Rep. 40, 103 P.3d 716, cert, denied, 109
R3d 804 (Utah 2005), cert, denied, 546 U.S.
817, 126 S. Ct. 343, 163 L. Ed. 2d 54 (2005).
— Standard.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, the court must construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences
in his favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light
Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991); Russell v.
Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995).
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Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811
P.2d 194 (Utah 1991).
A motion to dismiss under Subdivision (b)(6)
will be affirmed only if it appears to a certainty
that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief
under any state of facts which could be proved
in support of its claims. Heiner v. S.J. Groves &
Sons C o , 790 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);
Prows v. State, 822 R2d 764 (Utah 1991);
Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Allied Property &
Cas. Ins. C o , 890 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1995).
When reviewing a dismissal under this rule,
an appellate court must accept the material
allegations of the complaint as true, and the
trial court's ruling should be affirmed only if it
clearly appears that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim. Colman v.
Utah State Land B d , 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990);
Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 841
P.2d 742 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied, 853
P.2d 897 (Utah 1993); Wright v. University of
Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Because the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is a question of law, the appellate court
gives the trial court's ruling no deference and
reviews it under a correctness standard. St.
Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp, 811
P.2d 194 (Utah 1991); Wright v. University of
Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Russell v. Standard Corp, 898 P.2d 263 (Utah
1995); Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation C o ,
910 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1996).
In determining whether the trial court properly granted a motion to dismiss, the appellate
court must accept the factual allegations in the
complaint as true and consider all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from those facts in a
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Prows v.
State, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991); Whipple v.
American Fork Irrigation C o , 910 P.2d 1218
(Utah 1996).
Father did not dispute that the dismissal of
his prior paternity action was a final judgment
on the merits for purposes of claim preclusion,
but merely argued that he did not authorize his
prior attorney to dismiss the first action; however, the father's second complaint contained
no allegation that dismissal of his prior action
was not authorized. Because the father's second litigation was decided on Rule 12(b) motion
to dismiss, an appellate court did not consider
factual allegations outside the complaint. (Unpublished decision.) Belloso v. Lindberg, 2005
UT App 132, cert, denied, 125 P.3d 102 (Utah
2005).
Motion to dismiss for l a c k of v e n u e .

— F o r u m - s e l e c t i o n c l a u s e in c o n t r a c t .
The parties' prior agreement in the contract
that is the subject of the dispute as to the place
of the action will be given effect unless it is
unfair or unreasonable. Prows v. Pinpoint Re— S t a n d a r d of review.
tail S y s , 868 P.2d 809 (Utah 1993).
When reviewing a judgment entered on a
A plaintiff who brings an action in violation of
motion to dismiss under Subdivision (b)(6), the a choice-of-forum provision bears the burden of
Court of Appeals is obliged to construe the proving that enforcing the clause is unfair or
complaint in the light most favorable to the unreasonable; to meet this burden, a plaintiff
plaintiff and to indulge all reasonable infer- must demonstrate that the chosen state would
by the&Howard
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ences in its favor. Heiner v. Digitized
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be unjust. Prows v. Pinpoint Retail Sys., 868
P.2d 809 (Utah 1993).
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
granting the franchisers' motion to dismiss the
franchisees' breach of contract claim under
Subdivision (b)(3) where the franchisees failed
to meet their burden of demonstrating that the
forum selection clause in the signed agreement
was unfair or unreasonable; the franchisees did
not show that suit in Arkansas rather than
Utah would be difficult and inconvenient.
Coombs v. Juice Works Dev., Inc., 2003 UT App
388, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 52, 81 P.3d 769.
Presentation of defenses.
—Assigned claims.
Assigned claims of breach of fiduciary duty
and breach of contract alleged by investors who
lost money in a failed investment venture were
properly dismissed because the investors failed
to plead damages to a corporation that had
assigned its claims to the investors. Coroles v.
Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, 485 Utah Adv. Rep. 3,
79 P.3d 974.
—Fraud.
Primary fraud, securities fraud, and secondary fraud claims alleged by investors who lost
money in a failed investment venture were
properly dismissed because the investors failed
to plead with particularity, as required by Rule
9(b), in complaint that merely listed facts and
then recited the elements of fraud. Coroles v.
Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, 485 Utah Adv. Rep. 3,
79 P3d 974.
—How presented.
Affirmative defenses.
Since an affirmative defense raises matters
outside the scope of plaintiff's prima facie case,
any matter that does not tend to controvert the
opposing party's prima facie case should be
pleaded and is not put in issue by denial pursuant to Rule 8(b). Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352
(Utah 1986).
The Limitation of Landowner Liability Act
(§ 57-14-1 et seq.) is an "affirmative defense" or
an "avoidance" in a wrongful death action alleging negligence, and, to preserve the act as a
defense, it must be raised in the defendant's
answer. Golding v. Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co.,
793 P.2d 897 (Utah 1990).
Divorce.
Trial court did not err in refusing defendant's
motion to dismiss and for a more definite statement in answer to plaintiff's divorce petition
alleging cruelty and habitual intoxication in
general terms. MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120
Utah 573, 236 P2d 1066 (1951).
Election of remedies.
The defense of election of remedies is an
affirmative one that must be raised by way of
answer, motion, or demand and may not be
raised for the first time on appeal. Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibralter Fin. Corp., 603 P.2d
793 (Utah 1979).
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unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any
state of facts which could be proved in support
of the claim. Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas,
121 Utah 457, 243 P 2 d 441 (1952); Christensen
v. Lelis Automatic Transmission Serv., Inc., 24
Utah 2d 165, 467 P.2d 605 (1970).
A complaint is required to give the opposing
party fair notice of the nature and basis or
grounds of the claim and a general indication of
the type of litigation involved, or it is subject to
dismissal under Subdivision (b)(6). Utah Steel
& Iron Co. v. Bosch, 25 Utah 2d 85, 475 P.2d
1019 (1970).
Action against city for breach of implied
contract was properly dismissed for failure to
state claim upon which relief could be granted,
since the contract to review bids on an equal
basis was too nebulous to be enforceable, and
the city is immune to tort action for deceit.
Rapp v. Salt Lake City, 527 P.2d 651 (Utah
1974).
In an unlawful detainer action in which the
notice is defective, the defective notice results
in a failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted rather than lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Sovereen v. Meadows, 595
P.2d 852 (Utah 1979).
General and special appearances.
The distinction between general and special
appearances has been abolished by Subdivision
(b) of this rule. Ted R. Brown & Assocs. v.
Carnes Corp., 547 P2d 206 (Utah 1976).
Statute of frauds.
The defense of the statute of frauds is an
affirmative defense which must be pleaded pursuant to Rule 8(c) and may not be raised by a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Subdivision (b) of
this rule. W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Pappas,
24 Utah 2d 264, 470 P.2d 252 (1970).
Venue.
A motion to dismiss is not the correct form for
objecting to venue improperly laid; an objection
to venue should be made by a motion for change
of place of trial. Cannon v. Tuft, 3 Utah 2d 410,
285 P2d 843 (1955).
—When presented.
Amended answer.
Motion for leave to file an amended answer
was properly denied where movant failed to file
anything in support of the motion and did not
call the motion for hearing until the case was
called for trial four months later. Hein's Turkey
Hatcheries, Inc. v. Nephi Processing Plant, Inc.,
24 Utah 2d 271, 470 P.2d 257 (1970).
Security for costs of nonresident plaintiff.

—Failure to file.
An objection raised that security for costs
was not filed within one month after notice is at
best but a technical one. Dismissal of action
with prejudice was an abuse of discretion since
the policy of the law is to minimize the effect of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Ford Contractors, 2 Utah 2d 275, 272 R2d 191
(1954).
Where plaintiff died 16 days after initiating
suit, and 11 days after demand of a nonresident
cost bond under Subdivision (j), and, though
almost three months later, a surety bond was
filed as soon as an administrator was appointed, trial court should not dismiss action
for failure to file bond within 30 days. Hammond v. Calder, 8 Utah 2d 333, 334 R2d 562,
cert, denied, 361 U.S. 813, 80 S. Ct. 51, 4 L. Ed.
2d 60 (1959).
Standard of review.
The propriety of a dismissal under this rule is
a question of law, reviewable for correctness.
Stokes v. Van Wagoner, 1999 UT 94, 987 R2d
602.
Statute of limitations.
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
considering information outside of the complaint for purposes of the relevant date of the
inception of the loss for statute of limitations
purposes. Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 2002 UT 54, 53 R3d 947.
Summary judgment.
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clude some affirmative evidence relating to the
basis for the motion. Spoons v. Lewis, 1999 UT
82, 987 P.2d 36; Walter v. Stewart, 2003 UT App
86, 67 P.3d 1042, cert, denied, 73 P.3d 946
(2003).
—Court's discretion.
If a motion to dismiss under Subdivision
(b)(6) is presented, the decision to consider
matters outside the pleadings initially lies in
the discretion of the trial court. Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah, 561 P2d 191
(Utah 1977).
—Court's initiative.
A court should not, on its own initiative, try
to convert a motion for dismissal into one for
summary judgment by requesting additional
evidence. Hill ex rel. Fogel v. Grand Cent., Inc.,
25 Utah 2d 121, 477 P.2d 150 (1970).
—Defenses.
Defenses which have not been raised by the
answer or by proper motion may not be raised
in an affidavit in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment. Valley Bank & Trust Co. v.
Wilken, 668 P.2d 493 (Utah 1983).

— Opportunity to present pertinent mate—Conversion of motion to dismiss.
rial.
Motion to dismiss pursuant to Subdivision
Once the trial court makes a determination
(b)(6) may be converted to summary judgment
to consider materials outside the pleading upon
only when it appears as a matter of law that the a motion to dismiss, the mandatory provision of
plaintiff cannot recover; and where there was a
Subdivision (b) controls and all parties must be
question of actual knowledge of defendant as to given adequate notice and opportunity to subthe claim against the property, motion to dis- mit supporting materials, particularly the
miss and summary judgment were improper.
party against whom the motion has been made.
Harvey v. Sanders, 534 P.2d 905 (Utah 1975).
Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah,
Motion for dismissal in action for declaratory
561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977).
judgment as to constitutionality and legality of
It is necessary that the record clearly and
annexation conditions properly treated as moaffirmatively
demonstrate that, when a motion
tion for summary judgment. See Child v. City of
to dismiss is made and matters outside the
Spanish Fork, 538 P.2d 184 (Utah 1975).
pleading are presented to and not excluded by
It is generally not well advised to treat a
motion to dismiss as one for summary judg- the court, all parties are given reasonable opment. Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 portunity to present additional pertinent material if they wish. Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Utah
P2d 119 (Utah 1977).
Where defendant's motion was initially for Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n, 587 P2d 151 (Utah
1978).
dismissal because of plaintiff's failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted, once —Preclusion.
matters outside the pleadings were presented
Issues of fact.
to and not excluded by the trial court, the
It only takes one sworn statement to dispute
motion was properly treated as one for summary judgment. Lind v. Lynch, 665 P2d 1276 averments on other side of controversy and
(Utah 1983); Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., create issue of fact, precluding summary judgment. Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P2d 191
874 P2d 120 (Utah 1994).
(Utah 1975).
If a trial court cannot on its own motion
convert a Rule 12 motion to dismiss to a Rule 56
motion for summary judgment, then certainly Waiver of defenses.
the Supreme Court should not allow the mov- —Defect of parties.
ing party to do so on appeal. Colman v. Utah
Any objection to a defect of parties is waived,
State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990).
if not asserted by a party as provided in SubdiWhen affidavits or other evidence is pre- vision (h). Lewis v. Porter, 556 P.2d 496 (Utah
sented to support a motion to dismiss under
1976).
Subdivision (b)(6) of this rule and the court
does not exclude them, the motion is generally —Defective service of process.
treated as a motion for summary judgment
The affirmative defense of defective service of
pursuant to U.R.C.P. 56. DOIT, Inc. v. Touche,
process was waived by defendant, who failed to
Ross & Co., 926 R2d 835 (Utah 1996).
raise the defense in its motion to dismiss for
This rule does not convert motions based on
lack of jurisdiction and did not raise the issue
Digitized
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Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah
1991).
The trial court erred in ruling that plaintiffs7
failure to comply with the indorsement provision of § 78-36-8, which requires court indorsement of the summons, barred their action under Utah's forcible entry and detainer statute.
Defendant, by answering plaintiffs5 complaint
without raising the defense of insufficiency of
process and by proceeding through trial and the
verdict before raising that defense, waived it
under Subdivision (h) of this rule. Fowler v.
Seiter, 838 P.2d 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1992);
Keller v. Southwood N. Med. Pavilion, Inc., 959
P.2d 102 (Utah 1998).
—Exceptions.
Subject matter jurisdiction.
Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction
may be raised at any time and cannot be
waived by the parties. This prohibition against
waiver applies only to subject matter jurisdiction and is consistent with federal law. Barnard
v. Wassermann, 855 P2d 243 (Utah 1993).

Rule 12

counterclaim. Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 13
Utah 2d 397, 375 P.2d 456 (1962).
The statute of limitations defense must be
pleaded as an affirmative defense in a responsive pleading, or it is waived, unless an
amended pleading asserting the defense is allowed pursuant to the requirements of Rule
15(a). Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983); Keller v.
Southwood N. Med. Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102
(Utah 1998).
—Waiver.
Where plaintiff sought to rescind a contract
to purchase a business from defendant on
ground that the agreement was procured by
fraud, and defendant claimed that any fraud
had been waived by plaintiff's continued operation of the business, the allegation of waiver
was an affirmative defense which should have
been pleaded, and failure to do so constituted a
waiver of the defense under this rule. Bezner v.
Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 P2d 898
(Utah 1976).

Cited in Farrell v. Mennen Co., 120 Utah
377, 235 P.2d 128 (1951); Howard v. Town of
North Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 189, 281 P.2d 216
(1955); Thomas v. Heirs of Braffet, 6 Utah 2d
57, 305 P2d 507 (1956); Bench v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y, 21 Utah 2d 160, 442 P2d 924
(1968); Manger v. Davis, 619 P2d 687 (Utah
1980); Pratt v. City Council, 639 P2d 172 (Utah
1981); Carnes v. Carnes, 668 P2d 555 (Utah
—Failure to join indispensable party.
1983); Christenson v. Hayward, 694 P2d 612
When a party asserts the defense of failure to
(Utah
1984); Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leijoin an indispensable party for the first time at
sure Sports Inc., 740 P2d 1368 (Utah Ct. App.
the trial on the merits, it should be disposed of
1987); Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P2d 311 (Utah Ct.
as provided in Rule 15(b). Papanikolas Bros.
Enters, v. Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. Assocs., App. 1987); Rothey v. Walker Bank & Trust Co.,
754 P2d 1222 (Utah 1988); Arrow Indus., Inc. v.
535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975).
Zions First Nat'l Bank, 767 P.2d 935 (Utah
— Failure to pay consideration.
1988); Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 779 P.2d
Failure to pay consideration on a negotiable 668 (Utah 1989); Weber v. Snyderville West,
instrument is an affirmative defense which is 800 P2d 316 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert, denied,
required, under Rule 8(c), to be pleaded; and
815 P 2 d 241 (Utah 1991); Moffitt v. Barr, 837
unless it is pleaded, pursuant to Subdivision (h)
P2d 572 (Utah C t App. 1992); DeBry v. Valley
of this rule, it ordinarily will be considered
Mtg. Co., 835 P2d 1000 (Utah Ct. App. 1992);
waived as a defense, unless there is a motion to Atiya v. Salt Lake County, 852 P2d 1007 (Utah
amend, or the parties acquiesce in the trial of Ct. App. 1993); Richards Irrigation Co. v.
that issue, or the plaintiff is otherwise given
Karren, 880 P.2d 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Cruz v.
notice and an opportunity to meet the issue.
Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d
Olpin v. Grove Fin. Co., 521 P2d 1221 (Utah
1252 (Utah 1996); Hebertson v. Willowcreek
1974).
Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996); Valley
Colour, Inc., v. Beuchert Bldrs., Inc., 944 P.2d
—Mutual mistake.
Mutual mistake is an affirmative defense as 361 (Utah 1997); Harper v. Summit County, 963
P.2d 768 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), aff'd, 2001 UT
it raises matters outside the plaintiff's prima
10, 26 P.3d 193; Busche v. Salt Lake County,
facie case, and the failure to assert it is a
2001
UT App 111, 26 P.3d 862; United States v.
waiver of that defense. Mabey v. Kay Peterson
Smith, 225 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (D. Utah 2002);
Constr. Co., 682 P2d 287 (Utah 1984).
IHC Health Servs. v. D & K Mgmt., 2003 UT 5,
469 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 73 P.3d 320; Tom Heal
— Statute of frauds.
The statute of frauds is an affirmative de- Commer. Real Estate v. Overton, 2005 UT App
257, 116 P.3d 965; Lunceford v. Lunceford, 2006
fense which must be set forth in the pleadings,
UT App 266, 139 P.3d 1073; LPM Corp. v.
else it is waived. Phillips v. JCM Dev. Corp., 666
Smith, 2006 UT App 258, 139 P.3d 292;
P2d 876 (Utah 1983).
Cantamar, L.L.C. v. Champagne, 2006 UT App
—Statute of limitations.
321, 142 P3d 140; Tan v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co.,
In an action by water Digitized
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When issues raised.
Issues brought under the exceptions of Subdivision (h) may be raised before or during trial.
Subdivision (h) does not mean that failure to
state a claim can be raised for the first time on
appeal. Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P. 2d 763 (Utah
1985).
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Angel Investors, LLC v. Garrity, 2009 UT 40,
216 R3d 944.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs §§ 46 et
What, other than affidavits, constitutes "matseq., 86; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 125 et - ters outside the pleadings," which may convert
seq., 161 to 167, 209 to 222, 225, 230 to 237, motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
280, 389 et seq.
12(b), (c) into motion for summary judgment, 2
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Costs §§ 128, 133, 136, A . L . R . Fed. 1027.
138, 143, 144 162 et seq., 173; 27 C J S. Disj o i n d e r of counterclaim under Rule 13(a) or
missal and Nonsuit § 67; 71 C J.S^Pleading
1 3 ( b ) rf F e d e r a l R u l e g o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e w i t h
§§ 99 et seq., 112 to 116, 121 to 129, 264 to 268, : 1 ] r i s f i i p t : o n a i A9f9n^ unApr
wh)
as
RlliP
424 to 449, 463 to 482, 498, 508, 560 to 586.
Jurisdictional defense under M e l b ) as
AT o
r>- -U4.4.
I 4.
j * • I v • i waiver of such defense, 17 A.L.R. Fed. 388.
A.L.R. — Right to voluntary dismissal of civil
'
action as affected by opponent's motion for
Necessity of oral argument on motion for
summary judgment, judgment on the pleadsummary judgment on pleadings in federal
court
ings, or directed verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113.
> 105 A L R - Fed- 755-

Rule 13. Counterclaim and cross-claim.
(a) Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any
claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any
opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject-matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the time the
action was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action, or
(2) the opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment or other
process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal
judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under
this Rule 13.
(b) Permissive counterclaim. A pleading may state as a counterclaim any
claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's claim.
(c) Counterclaim exceeding opposing claim. A counterclaim may or may not
diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party. It may claim
relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought in the pleading
of the opposing party.
(d) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after pleading. A claim which either
matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving his pleading may, with
the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supplemental
pleading.
(e) Omitted counterclaim. When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim
through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by amendment.
(f) Cross-claim against co-party. A pleading may state as a cross-claim any
claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject-matter either of the original action or of a
counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject-matter of
the original action. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the party
against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or
part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant.
(g) Additional parties may be brought in. When the presence of parties other
than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete relief
in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order
them to be brought in as defendants as provided in these rules, if jurisdiction
of them can be obtained.
(h) Separate judgments. Judgment on a counterclaim or cross-claim may be
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
excusable neglect based solely on a court clerk's
failure to mail notice; however it does not mean
that, in a situation where the clerk failed to
send notice, no other facts can be combined
with that fact to find there was excusable
neglect. West v. Grand County, 942 R2d 337
(Utah 1997).

Appeal.
—Default judgments.
Notice of orders or judgments.
—Default judgments.
Cited.
Appeal.
—Default judgments.
The time for taking an appeal from a default
judgment in the former city courts (now circuit
courts) dated from notice of entry of the judgment and not from the date of the entry of
judgment in the city court. Buckner v. Main
Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 124, 288 P.2d 786
(1955).
Notice of orders or judgments.
This rule prohibits any court from finding

—Default j udgment s.
It was unnecessary to mail notice of contempt
findings to ex-wife who had ignored the notice
of hearing and had refused to appear. Peterson
v. Peterson, 530 R2d 821 (Utah 1974).
Cited in Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen,
656 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 15A Am. Jur. 2d Clerks of
Court §§ 14, 22, 24, 25; 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts
§§ 16 et seq., 42 et seq., 61; 56 Am. Jur. 2d
Motions, Rules, and Orders § 39; 75 Am. Jur.
2d Trial § 33.
C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 236 et seq.; 49
C.J.S. Judgments § 112; 60 C.J.S. Motions and
Orders § 61; 88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 30, 38, 39.
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to
liability against defaulting defendant, 8
A.L.R.3d 1070.
Appealability of order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d
1272.
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and
hearing as to determination of amount of damages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586.
Opening default or default judgment claimed

to have been obtained because of attorney's
mistake as to time or place of appearance, trial,
or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 1255.
Validity and construction of constitution or
statute authorizing exclusion of public in sex
offense cases, 39 A.L.R.3d 852.
Right of accused to have press or other media
representatives excluded from criminal trial,
49 A.L.R.3d 1007.
Power of court to impose standard of personal
appearance or attire, 73 A.L.R.3d 353.
What amounts to "appearance" under statute
or rule requiring notice, to party who has "appeared," of intention to take default judgment,
73 A.L.R.3d 1250.
Applicability of judicial immunity to acts of
clerk of court under state law, 34 A.L.R.4th
1186.

Rules 78 to 80. Repealed.
Repeals. — Rule 78, relating to motion day,
Rule 79, relating to books and records kept by
the clerk, and Rule 80, relating to reporters and

record transcripts, were repealed by order of
the Supreme Court, effective May 1, 1991.

PART XI. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Rule 81. Applicability of rules in general.
(a) Special statutory proceedings. These rules shall apply to all special
statutory proceedings, except insofar as such rules are by their nature clearly
inapplicable. Where a statute provides for procedure by reference to any part
of the former Code of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be in accordance
with these rules.
(b) Probate and guardianship. These rules shall not apply to proceedings in
uncontested probate and guardianship matters, but shall apply to all proceedings subsequent to the joinder of issue therein, including the enforcement of
any judgment or order entered.
(c) Application to small claims. These rules shall not apply to small
proceedings except as expressly incorporated in the Small Claims Rules.
(d) On appeal from
or review
of a W.
ruling
or order
an administrative
board
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Rule 81

from or obtaining a review of any order, ruling or other action of an
administrative board or agency, except insofar as the specific statutory
procedure in connection with any such appeal or review is in conflict or
inconsistent with these rules.
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. These rules of procedure shall also
govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other applicable
statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict with any
statutory or constitutional requirement.
(Amended effective November 1, 2001.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds
to Rule 81, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Administrative Rulemaking Act, Title 63G, Chapter 3.

Justice courts generally, Title 78A, Chapter
5.
Uniform Probate Code, Title 75.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Administrative proceedings.
Adoption proceedings.
City and justices' courts.
Criminal proceedings.
Special statutory proceedings.
Cited.

An appeal from the Utah Transportation
Commission is governed by Subdivision (d) and,
thus, must be made within 30 days of the
Commission's notice to a litigant of its decision.
Reagan Outdoor Adv., Inc. v. Utah Dep't of
Transp., 589 P.2d 782 (Utah 1979).
This rule does not make the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure apply to administrative proceedings; rather, it makes clear that state
courts reviewing administrative cases are governed by the rules of procedure. Frito-Lay v.
Utah Labor Comm'n, 2009 UT 71, 222 P.3d*55.

Administrative proceedings.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are inapplicable to a proceeding before an administrative body seeking to regulate activities burdened with a public interest. Entre Nous Club
v. Toronto, 4 Utah 2d 98, 287 P2d 670 (1955).
Adoption proceedings.
Where road commission's order that sign be
The Rules of Civil Procedure are not uby their
removed had been followed by negotiations and
nature clearly inapplicable" to adoption procorrespondence between parties as advertiser
ceedings. Thiele v. Anderson, 1999 UT App 56,
sought modification of order, district court had
975 P.2d 481.
jurisdiction to review order in proceedings inEven if adoption proceedings are "special
stituted within thirty days of commission's defstatutory proceedings" under Rule 81(a), Rule
inite and final refusal to change its order,
41(a)( 1) is not inherently "clearly inapplicable"
notwithstanding that notice of the order had
to adoption proceedings. Thiele v. Anderson,
been given advertiser several months before.
1999 UT App 56, 975 P2d 481.
National Adv. Co. v. Utah State lid. Comm'n, 26
City and justices' courts.
Utah 2d 132, 486 P.2d 383 (1971).
Although Rule 55(a)(2) and Rule 5(a) provide
Where plaintiff sought declaratory judgment
that no service or notice need be served on a
as to the nature of the legal relationship beparty in default, the time for appeal from a
tween the No-Fault Insurance Act and the
Workmen's Compensation Act and no facts default judgment in a city court (now circuit
court) ran from date of notice of entry of such
were required to be pleaded or proved, there
was no need to exhaust tbe administrative judgment rather than from the date of judgment. Buckner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4
remedies prior to seeking a declaratory judgUtah 2d 124, 288 P.2d 786 (1955) (but see Rule
ment. IML Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d
58A(d).
296 (Utah 1975), overruled on other grounds,
Neel v. State, 889 R2d 922 (Utah 1995).
Criminal proceedings.
Although the Insurance Code specifically outFormer §§ 77-46-1 and 77-46-2 made this
lines procedures governing appeals from the
rule and the Rules of Civil Procedure pertainInsurance Commissioner's decisions, there is
ing to discovery inapplicable to discovery in
nothing therein which is inconsistent or in
criminal cases. State v. Nielsen, 522 P.2d 1366
conflict with the application of the Rules of (Utah 1974).
Civil Procedure which provide for a limit on the
Rule 52 applies to criminal actions. State v.
time to appeal. Utah Chiropractic Ass'n v. Eq- Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988).
uitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 579 P2d 1327
Defendant's "motion to reconsider" his sen(Utah 1978).
tence could not be treated as a motion to alter
The one-month time limit for appeals in
or amend the judgment under Utah R. Civ. P.
former Rule 73 applied to appeals from the
59(e); because Utah R. Crim. P. 22 specifically
Insurance Commissioner's decisions under the
applies to sentences, this rule makes Rule 59
former Insurance Code, since the statutory
inapplicable. (Unpublished decision.) State v.
scheme (former §§ 31-4-9 and 31-4-11) failed to
McGuire,
2005J. Reuben
UT App
13.Law School, BYU.
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provide for any limit. Utah Chiropractic Ass'n
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malfeasance in office is a special statutory
action to which the Rules of Civil Procedure are
applicable. State v. Geurts, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359
P2d 12 (1961).
The taking of depositions pursuant to the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable in
an action to remove a public official from office
for malfeasance pursuant to § 77-6-2. State v.
Geurts, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P2d 12 (1961).
Rule 65B(b) is "clearly inapplicable" to a
proceeding to remove a public official from office
for malfeasance pursuant to § 77-6-2. State v.
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Geurts, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 R2d 12 (1961).
Cited in National Adv. Co. v. Utah State Rd.
Comm'n, 26 Utah 2d 132, 486 R2d 383 (1971);
Nelson v. State Tax Comm'n, 29 Utah 2d 162,
506 R2d 437 (1973); RDG Associates/Jarman
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 741 P.2d 948 (Utah
1987); Brigham City v. Valencia, 779 R2d 1149
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); Career Serv. Review Bd.
v. Utah Dep't of Cors., 942 R2d 933 (Utah
1997); State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, 999
R2d 1252.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 1 C.J.S. Actions § 39.

Rule 82. Jurisdiction and venue unaffected.
These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state or the venue of actions therein.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is based on
Rule 82, F.R.C.P.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — The Use
of Rule 37(b)(2)(A) Sanction to Establish In

Personam Jurisdiction, 1982 B.Y.U. L. Rev.
103.

Rule 83. Repealed.
Repeals. — Rule 83, authorizing rules by
district courts, was repealed by order of the
Supreme Court, effective May 1, 1991.

Rule 84. Forms.
The forms contained in the Appendix of Forms are sufficient under the rules
and are intended to indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement which the
rules contemplate.
Compiler's N o t e s . — This rule is similar to
Rule 84, F.R.C.P

Rule 85. Title.
These rules may be known and cited as the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or
abbreviated U.R.C.R
Compiler's N o t e s . — This rule is similar to
Rule 85, F.R.C.P.

PART XII. FAMILY LAW
Rule 100. Coordination of cases pending in district court
and juvenile court.
(a) Notice to the court In a case in which child custody, child support or
parent time is an issue, all parties have a continuing duty to notify the court:
Howard W.
Library,child
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Law School,
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